The Taliban Phenomenon

The victory of the Taliban (recognized as a terrorist organization in the Russian Federation) over the US and the puppet government of Afghanistan (as well as the NATO forces occupying the country) in 2021 changed the regional geopolitics of Central Asia. On the one hand, a power vacuum (in the usual sense) emerged and on the other hand, some threats began to transform more intensely. For example, control of the north-western border became a pressing issue for Pakistan because the Taliban do not recognise established international borders and because there is a separate Taliban entity within Pakistan that qualifies as a terrorist organisation.

At the same time the Taliban are quite active internationally and their participation in the Russia-Islamic World Forum in Kazan in May 2023 shows that they are to cooperate with them. And this requires a more thorough and scrupulous study of the Taliban phenomenon.

In fact, it would be more accurate to say that the Taliban is not a political-religious movement in the classical sense, but an ecosystem. An ecosystem, unlike a classical firm, is based on modularity rather than hierarchical management, with the need to coordinate and share complementary resources and competencies. Given the above, an ecosystem can be defined as a set of autonomous organisations producing complementary components of value that form a certain structure of relationships and alignment without the need for vertical integration (1).

One explanation for the widespread acceptance of the ecosystem concept is its breadth and interdisciplinarity (2). Paramilitary, including terrorist organisations, may also represent specific ecosystems. Among terrorist organisations, the Taliban best fit the definition of an ecosystem. First, the movement has a very long history and continuity with the Mujahideen, whose combat units were created jointly by the US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to counter the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Second, there is a clear religious identity, which is a social cohesive factor. Thirdly, the extensive network structure and the presence of two wings, political and military, point to a complex organisational model that is inherently dynamic. Fourth, the constant adaptation to new conditions, from the development of the drug trade to the use of new types of weapons, indicates a high level of self-organization and attempts to achieve a sufficient level of autarchy to be independent of external sponsors or donors. Finally, the transition from quasi-state actor to de facto Afghan government demonstrates the Taliban’s successful governance functions, as well as its resistance to external military and political pressure, which makes this organisation the subject of numerous research instances.

Ethnopolitics, local customs and traditions, religion, martial arts, and criminal activities are all aspects that can be found in Taliban activities.

However, to adequately understand the organisation, we need to view them in relation to one another. The Taliban movement was based on the network of Deobandi school madrasas in Pakistan, which trained both the leadership and the rank and file of the organisation. Thousands of young men were mobilised from these madrasas to fight against the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which was supported by the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Militant groups of mujahedin organised themselves into larger networks called ‘fronts’, or mahazas, each headed by a ‘great leader’ who was able to distribute military supplies from foreign donors to field commanders across the front. In doing so, part of the organisation sought to distinguish itself from other mujahideen groups by offering a more demonstrative religious jihad. Over the years the young fighters of the future Taliban formed strong bonds with the movement and with each other through the hardships of war. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan survived until April 1992, when it was liquidated in a civil war. The chaos in the country led to the emergence of numerous factions and gangs, which the Taliban eventually overcame by imposing their religious rule. Theo Farrell, based on a large number of original interviews with Afghan Taliban leaders, officials and field commanders, concluded that the insurgency is highly resilient and invincible by military means alone (3).

At the heart of the Taliban movement is a horizontal network based on common religious education and shared military experience, which endows the group with a powerful, unifying ideology and worldview.

The Taliban’s first capture of Kabul in 1996 and their strategic victory in the civil war turned Afghanistan into a key space for Islamic terrorism, as the Taliban regime emerged as one of the largest state sponsors of terrorism, especially for al-Qaida (recognised as a terrorist organisation in the Russian Federation). Bin Laden, who was an active financier and liaison with the mujahideen during the Afghan-Mujahideen war (4), effectively established al-Qaeda in 1988. The Taliban’s interest in transforming Afghanistan into a traditional Islamic society also made the Taliban regime more immune to outside pressures, which also affected the decision to grant protection to al-Qaeda. Furthermore, al-Qaeda’s deployment in Afghanistan directly benefited the Taliban, as bin Laden’s links to private financial networks in the Gulf region helped ensure a steady flow of funds into Afghanistan, relieving pressure on Afghanistan’s socio-economic development or the need to accept international aid. It should be noted that these organisations have had their differences, for example the Taliban is almost exclusively a Pashtun organisation, i.e. it is an ethno-nationalist group. But for al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, ethnicity is irrelevant. These underlying ideological differences influenced the strategic priorities of both groups: the Taliban were focused on winning the war against the Afghan government rather than carrying out the global jihad envisioned by al-Qaida. The case of the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade is interesting.

When the movement first emerged in Kandahar in 1994 and began to expand into southern Afghanistan, its financial resources and operational capabilities, such as weapons, came from other sources, namely external sponsors such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Another source of income (in fact, until 2021) was from controlling the trafficking of legal goods (smuggling) under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement. And the spread of the Taliban across the country also occurred largely before the group started to exploit the illicit drug economy. It is likely that the need to consolidate its political power after the military expansion took place prompted the Taliban to engage in the drug economy (5).

By 1996, the Taliban had adopted the principle of non-interference in drug cultivation, which gradually turned into the taxation of farmers and the security and taxation of traffickers. New decrees issued by the Taliban after 1996 stated: “The cultivation and trade of hashish (cannabis used for hashish) is absolutely prohibited. The consumption of opiates is prohibited, as is the production of heroin, but the production and trade of opium is not” (6). In practice, however, heroin laboratories or trade have not been eliminated. The 10% zakat on opium previously paid to village mullahs began to go into Taliban coffers. earning an estimated $9 million in 1996-7 from the regular production of 1500 tonnes of opium in the south. Traffickers were also charged 10% zakat. As the 1990s progressed, these taxes were increased to 20%, generating between $45 million and $200 million a year (7). By 1999, the Taliban also taxed heroin laboratories. The Taliban also sought to expand and regulate the drug economy by granting official government licences for opium cultivation, establishing model farms to train farmers to grow poppies more efficiently, and distributing fertilizer for poppy cultivation. Furthermore, as in the case of illegal smuggling of legal goods, the illicit drug economy has also allowed other forms of micro-economic activity to develop in areas where only limited agricultural production previously existed. Services such as rest stops, tea shops and petrol stations emerged in connection with drug smuggling. Thus, many people became interested in the illicit drug economy: traders, smugglers, shopkeepers as well as local warlords and religious elites, who were tolerated by the Taliban and allowed to interfere in the drug economy. However, the Taliban did ban opium poppy cultivation in late 1999, resulting in the largest reduction in opium poppy cultivation in any single year in the country. The area under cultivation decreased from some 82,172 hectares in 2000 to less than 8,000 in 2001. Globally, this reduction contributed to a 75% reduction in the global heroin supply for that year By banning opium poppy cultivation in 2000, the Taliban did not prohibit or otherwise impede the sale and trafficking of opium and poppy during this period. By deciding to curb production, the Taliban risked its domestic political capital, based crucially on its sponsorship of the poppy economy, in the hope of gaining international legitimacy.

Much of the international community treated the Taliban regime as a pariah – with Russia, China and Iran actively supporting the Taliban’s weakening armed adversary, the Northern Alliance. By 2000, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had recognised the Taliban regime. Over the past 20 years, opium poppy cultivation continued to underpin much of the economic and political life of Afghanistan throughout the country. This business is deeply embedded in the country’s social and economic fabric and thus inevitably in its political machinery and power relations. During this period, the Taliban managed to generate tens to hundreds of millions of dollars per year from Afghanistan’s poppy-growing economy. Estimates for 2020 put the figure at $416 million.

It should be noted that during this period, no alternative livelihoods have emerged for many Afghan people. Western-backed government cash-for-work programmes reached only a small percentage of the population, mostly those living close to the cities. The general pauperisation of the population was devastating. Unable to repay their debts, many farmers were forced to sell their daughters as brides when they were three years old or leave for Pakistan. In Pakistan, refugees often ended up in the radical Deobandi madrasas and began to join the ranks of the Taliban. This case shows that the situation with the Taliban is more complex than a simple political settlement and reconciliation with opponents. The question of creating an alternative to replace the economic segment built on drug production and trafficking will have to be solved sooner or later.

The Taliban, like any other paramilitary religious organisation, had its own ideology and set of rules which it extended to its members and converts.

Since Mullah Omar had absolute power, his orders were considered binding, they were the demands of Allah (fardh) (8). Many early decisions of the Taliban that were internationally condemned, such as the destruction of the giant statues of Buddha or hostility towards Sufi traditions, which were deeply rooted in popular Islam in Afghanistan, are related to this.

A separate but important topic is the publication of Taliban doctrinal documents that have been disseminated as guidelines for the management of the organisation’s tactical units. In 2006, the so-called Layeh appeared, which was a kind of field manual for the Taliban and included many provisions from the traditional Pashtunwali code of ethics. This document had only 30 rules, which were presented as norms. In 2009, the US military drew attention to a new doctrinal document, Rules and Regulations for the Mujahideen. As indicated in a policy brief prepared by the National Security Affairs Division of the US Naval War College, distribution of this latest code of conduct to the Taliban apparently began in early 2009 (9). However, the 17 rules from the 2006 Layha were repeated in the 2009 manifesto. The US military concluded that the target audience for the 2009 manual was notional “team leaders,” i.e. tactical-level Taliban commanders in charge of a cadre of 10-15 people. It also outlines the organisational responsibilities of both district and provincial commanders.

Examination of the document indicates that the Taliban are attempting to wage a guerrilla campaign by implementing a rudimentary, population-centric strategy; at the same time, they make reference to elements of Pashtunwali (10) and Shariah (Islamic) law. It is likely that this manifesto was an attempt by senior Taliban leadership, in particular Mullah Muhammad Omar (Emir ul-Mominin) and Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader (Deputy Emir), to strengthen their command and control of the organisation as a whole and introduce discipline into unstable Taliban factions. Mullah Omar is mentioned in the document as Imam and Mullah Berader is mentioned as Assistant Imam. Subsequently, the Taliban issued additional manifestos to its members and followers to continue indoctrination and prevent the infiltration of other ideas.

The West, represented by the US and NATO, tried unsuccessfully to carry out their propaganda, betting on human rights, the emancipation of women, education for children, etc. But brutal military operations, which caused a large number of civilian casualties, effectively nullified the propaganda efforts.

The victims of US drone strikes and their relatives became Taliban supporters because they saw them as protectors and fighters for justice. The Taliban’s eventual victory in 2021 shows that doctrinal changes and careful work with the ideological component were not done in vain.

The Taliban have throughout their history cooperated extensively with external forces as well as with representatives of the Afghan authorities. For the most part this has been done in secret. However, information has been regularly leaked, exposing the Taliban’s extensive and well-organized intelligence, agency and political network. Prominent members of the two main opposition parties, the National Coalition of Afghanistan (NCA) and the National Front of Afghanistan (NFA), expressed concern at the time about Karzai’s ties to Taliban fighters. At an NFA leadership meeting in Kabul in early April 2012, former Vice President Ahmad Zia Masood warned that the government was “working to strengthen terrorist groups” and that this was facilitated by “high-level government leaders” who were “trying to facilitate Taliban infiltration of security forces.” Lack of national unity was also a major national problem, which the Taliban actively exploited.

Looking at the Taliban as an ecosystem, which is inherently evolving and transforming, one can come to interesting conclusions. While the organisation is still recognised as a terrorist organisation in many countries (though this has not prevented Taliban delegations from negotiating and visiting other states), there is a strong possibility that it may gain international legitimacy in time. In reality, the most appropriate approach for Afghanistan, as represented by the Taliban, is to develop a strategy that is coherent with regional actors more broadly (Central Asian republics, China, Russia, Iran, Gulf states), while at the same time trying to develop a Western position based on the thesis that it is better to accept the reality of a Taliban return to power and try to influence rather than isolate them.

Overall, the discourse of Islamabad, Tehran, Moscow and Beijing is in line with Western expectations: the need for an inclusive government, respect for human rights and especially women’s rights and a commitment not to harbour terrorist groups. The question is how long it will take to achieve this and how to obtain concessions from the Taliban in return for economic support for the reconstruction of the country and necessary humanitarian aid. However, in the context of confrontation between the West on the one hand and Russia, Iran, China on the other, Afghanistan could be used by the US and NATO countries as a hotbed of destabilisation to prevent it from joining a coalition of non-Western countries that support a course towards multipolarity.

https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/taliban-phenomenon

References:

1 Ramenskaya L.A. Applying the concept of ecosystems in economic-management research. The manager, 2020. Vol. 11, No. 4. С. 19.
http://upravlenets.usue.ru/images/86/2.pdf

2 Autio E., Nambisan S., Thomas L.D.W., Wright M. (2018). Digital affordances, spatial affordances, and the genesis of entrepreneurial ecosystems. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 72-95. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1002/sej.1266.

3 Theo Farrell. Unbeatable: Social Resources, Military Adaptation, and the Afghan Taliban.
https://tnsr.org/2018/05/unbeatable-social-resources-military-adaptation-and-the-afghan-taliban/.

4 Western research into the involvement of the mujahedin in the war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan usually uses the term Afghanistan-Soviet war. But it is clearly incorrect, since the USSR decided to support the legitimate government of Afghanistan on the basis of their request. If we continue to use the term Afghan-Soviet war, then any U.S. support for its allies and partners, as well as occupation operations, should be referred to as a war with the prefix -American. Thus, until now, we will have ongoing wars in a number of countries – the Korean-American War (because there are US troops in South Korea and the DPRK does not recognise the US right to this presence), the Iraqi-American War, the Afghan-American War 2001-2021, the Syrian-American War (because of the illegal US military presence in northern Syria in Kurdish enclaves), etc.

5 Vanda Felbab-Brown. Pipe Dreams: The Taliban and Drugs from the 1990s into Its New Regime. 09/15/2021.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/pipe-dreams-taliban-and-drugs-1990s-its-new-regime.

6 Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind. London: Pluto Press. 2001, p. 153.

7 There are other estimates that show different figures. For instance, Barnett Rubin argued that the Taliban earned between $100 and 200 million a year. Afghanistan, Drugs and Terrorism: Merging Wars, TNI Briefing Series, Drugs and Conflict, No. 3. December 2001; Barnett R. Rubin, The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan // World Development. Vol. 28, no. 10, pp. 1789-1803.

8 Thomas Barfield. Afghanistan. A Cultural and Political History. Princeton University Press. Р. 261.

9 Understanding Afghan Culture. Analyzing the Taliban Code of Conduct: Reinventing the Layeha. Department of National Security Affairs. Naval Postgraduate School. August 6 2009.

10 Pashtunwali is the traditional code of ethics of the Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan and Pakistan.