Iran and the Nuclear Question

Iran and the West are at an impasse regarding the resolution of the question of Iran’s nuclear program. Diplomatic options have largely stalled, increasing the risk of war. But a war with Iran could carry severe costs for both Israel and the US, and the region will most likely remain in a state of high tension for some time to come.

The recent decision by the UN Security Council to implement so-called “snapback” sanctions against Iran for alleged violations of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) highlights the concerns of many Western nations, including the US (which withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018) and the European participants (France, Germany, the UK — the so-called E3 — and the EU), about the true intent of Iran’s nuclear program. The UN vote, initiated at the behest of the European participants in the JCPOA, was opposed by both Russia and China, who sponsored a rival resolution designed to prevent the snapback sanctions, signaling a decisive split within the ranks of the JCPOA participants. The restored sanctions reimpose restrictions on sensitive nuclear activity (but not an outright blanket ban on enrichment), and also prohibit ballistic missile development, block conventional arms imports, allow for the seizure of Iranian weapons shipments, and reimpose travel bans and an asset freeze on specific individuals. Iran has rejected the UN action and has appealed to all countries to “refrain from recognizing this unlawful situation.”

Iranian authorities, in private meetings with journalists during the UN General Assembly debate, acknowledged that sanctions hurt the Iranian economy, and as such, the Iranian people. However, these officials stated their belief that the situation inside Iran had fundamentally changed in the months following the 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran in June. They argued that the conflict has left Iran more unified today that at any time since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and had smoothed over fractures within Iranian society and the government itself that left the country more vulnerable to the kind of societal pressures created by sanctions. That view can be disputed, but if true, this spells trouble for those, like the US and the EU, who view the renewal of sanctions as a viable tool for compelling Iran to compromise on its nuclear program. It also significantly reduces the potential for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis, and as such, pushes the region closer to renewed conflict between Iran and Israel.

The Nuclear Question

Looming large over the issue of war and peace in the Middle East is the question of Iran’s nuclear program — its legitimacy, viability and survivability. While the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) recognizes the right to peaceful nuclear energy, including enrichment, this is conditional on safeguards compliance as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As Western sanctions designed to prevent Iran from acquiring specific technologies needed to pursue nuclear energy prompted Iran to resort to procurement activities that fell outside the framework of the safeguards regime, questions were raised in the West and Israel regarding the true intent of Iran’s nuclear activities. With the US and EU taking the lead, the international community sought to impose restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program designed to prevent Tehran from engaging in nuclear activities possessing a military dimension. The result of that pressure was the JCPOA, which allowed Iran to enrich uranium, but only under a monitoring regime above and beyond that required under Iran’s safeguards agreement.

The US’ precipitous withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 set in motion events that would see the de facto nullification of the tighter inspection regime. Iran, claiming that the E3 and the EU had failed to live up to their obligations under the terms of the JCPOA, began to reduce its level of compliance with its JCPOA monitoring obligations, something permitted under the terms of the JCPOA. But the US, E3 and EU see Iran’s decision to enrich uranium to 60% — a level of enrichment that goes beyond civilian energy needs and is one short step away from being weapons-grade — as unprecedented for a state without a nuclear weapons program. US President Donald Trump in June appeared to line up behind Israel’s accusation that Iran actively has an active nuclear weapons program, contrary to the view of the US intelligence community.

This 60%-enriched uranium became the center of a controversy that propelled the region toward an armed conflict. The US, pushed by Israel, insisted that Iran turn over its stocks of 60%-enriched uranium for destruction. Moreover, because Iran began drastically curtailing the inspection activities of the IAEA, Israel has consistently insisted Iran abandon enrichment altogether, while US positions have generally focused on strict limits and verification rather than a total ban.

Iranian authorities have stated that the 60% enrichment was never done for military purposes. Rather, Iran made the decision to go to 60% enrichment only after Israel carried out attacks against Iranian enrichment facilities in Natanz, causing major damage to thousands of centrifuges. The goal, Iranian officials claim, was always to use the 60% as negotiating leverage, and Tehran has always been willing to dilute the 60%-enriched uranium to levels that correlate with Iran’s declared peaceful nuclear programs. In exchange, the West would need to lift all sanctions and agree to Iran’s nuclear enrichment programs. The Iranian authorities made clear that the decision regarding the rejection of a nuclear weapons program goes beyond the restrictions imposed by the fatwa issued by the supreme leader — the Iranian government itself has made it clear that Iran will not pursue a nuclear weapons program. On this, there is firm agreement — even after the events of the 12-day conflict with Israel.

Going Forward

As things currently stand, Iran and the West (the US, E3, EU, and Israel) are at an impasse for which there is no ready solution. Iran’s relationship with the IAEA appears to be irreconcilably tainted, with the IAEA accusing Iran of violating its obligations under the NPT, and Iran accusing the IAEA of supplying information about Iran’s nuclear program and scientists to the US and Israel, which was then used to target Iran during the June conflict. As things stand, IAEA access has been restricted, partially restored, and then threatened again — leaving monitoring fragile, although not entirely absent. Moreover, Iran is believed to still retain stockpiles of 60%-enriched uranium sufficient to produce several nuclear warheads if stepped up to weapons-grade levels of enrichment.

The imposition of snapback sanctions has likewise curtailed any negotiation path that might have existed prior to the Security Council action. While Iran is prepared to find a diplomatic off-ramp, its condition — that Iran retain its uranium enrichment program — is a nonstarter for the US and Israel and, by extension, the E3 and EU.

This increases the risk of military confrontation. Iranian authorities have made it clear that while they do not seek a war, they will defend themselves robustly using the full range of military capabilities available to it, including advanced ballistic missiles that could challenge US and Israeli missile defense systems. Moreover, Iran has moved to address shortfalls in its defense identified during the 12-day conflict.

While Israel and the US retain significant strike capability, they are hampered by the fact that missile defenses are limited, although not entirely ineffective against Iran’s advanced ballistic missiles. In other words, they no longer enjoy the scale of the advantages they did at the start of the June conflict. In short, any military action against Iran would carry major risks for both Israel and the US, and outcomes remain uncertain, a harsh reality which serves as the best deterrent for any such action.

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