Trump’s First 100 Days: Russia and Iran

On the presidential campaign trail in 2024, Donald Trump articulated a foreign policy agenda that blended classic isolationism with old-fashioned “big stick” diplomacy predicated on the notion of “peace through strength.” The geopolitical situation that gave birth to this policy amalgam, however, altered in the weeks after he was elected — in particular, the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and perception of Russian and Iranian vulnerability have opened the door to new policy considerations. This new post-election reality paves the way for potential policy breakthroughs on Russia and Iran in the Trump administration’s first 100 days in office.

Prior to the final collapse of the government of al-Assad on Dec. 8, the transition team of US President-elect Trump was focused on the need to convince Russia that it was in its best interests to agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities in Ukraine and on how to prop up a faltering Israel in a way that could pressure Iran into walking away from its nuclear program.

The sudden demise of the Al-Assad regime, however, brought new perceptions of Russian military overextension and Iranian weakness, opening the door to policy formulations that allowed the Trump transition team to assume a more assertive posture.

The ‘Single Phone Call’ Myth

At the close of the Republican Party National Convention on Jul. 18, Trump announced that he could “stop wars with just a telephone call,” declaring: “I will end every single international crisis that the current administration has created, including the horrible war with Russia and Ukraine.”

Trump’s notions of grandeur — combined with the tone-deaf pronouncements of his designated foreign and national security policy nominees, including Keith Kellogg, a retired lieutenant general tapped to be Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine, and Michael Waltz, Trump’s pick for national security adviser — produced plans for a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine predicated on Russia agreeing to a freeze in the fighting and the establishment of a line of demarcation based upon the disposition of troops at the time of any cease-fire taking effect. The proposal, drafted by Kellogg, also kept the door open for Ukraine’s eventual Nato membership, along with the deployment of Nato forces in Ukraine as part of a post-conflict peacekeeping force.

In the days and weeks following his election as president, Trump was confronted with the consequences of the Biden administration’s decision to grant Ukraine permission to use US-supplied Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) missiles against targets inside Russia. Moscow responded by employing a new strategic ballistic missile, the Oreshnik, in retaliation and approving a new nuclear doctrine that lowered the threshold for nuclear weapons use by Russia. This strong Russian reaction made any future effort to strong-arm Russia to the negotiating table problematic.

However, the rapid fall of al-Assad in Syria, and the uncertain fate of the Russian military garrisons stationed there since 2015, brought a fresh assessment of Russian military capability colored by the Syrian debacle. This assessment held that Russia was both humiliated and overextended and that Russian President Vladimir Putin was looking for a way out of the Ukraine trap he created for himself by invading that nation in February 2022.

Unfortunately for Team Trump, this assessment proved wrong. During his annual end-of-year press conference on Dec. 26, when asked about the Trump plan for the cessation of hostilities premised on these new assessments, Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected it out of hand. Ukraine, sensing that the incoming Trump administration responds to strength, has launched a new offensive in the Russian Kursk region to reshape the battlefield realities. Initial assessments suggest this has stalled.

This may open the door for a more pragmatic and realistic assessment of the situation in Ukraine when the Trump administration takes office Jan. 20. If so, there might be a pathway toward a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Otherwise, the prognosis is for a continuation of a war of attrition until a point when Ukraine’s ability to defend itself collapses.

A ‘Better Deal’ on Iran

When Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2018, he claimed that the 2015 agreement negotiated by the Obama administration was a “bad deal” and that his goal was to negotiate a “better deal.” Central to Trump’s thesis was that the JCPOA, which ostensibly created a one-year breakout window for Iran regarding its ability to produce nuclear weapons, failed in its objective once the so-called “sunset clauses” limiting Iran’s centrifuge-based uranium enrichment capabilities began to expire.

In the nearly six years since Trump announced the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran has essentially stopped complying with its obligations under the JCPOA, largely on the basis that the agreement no longer provided effective sanctions relief. Today, Iran is assessed as being only weeks away from being able to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels, making it a de facto threshold nuclear power. This reality led the administration of President Joe Biden, according to reporting from Axios, to consider the need for a preemptive military strike prior to leaving office. It will be one of the top issues that Trump, who has declared that he will never allow Iran to possess nuclear weapons capability, will confront upon being sworn in.

The precipitous collapse of the Syrian regime, however, has injected a new geopolitical reality into the mix, especially as Iran’s moderate President Masoud Pezeshkian has indicated he is not seeking a confrontation with either Israel or the US and would be willing to enter talks on how to reduce tensions in the Middle East region. On the campaign trail, Trump declared that his goal on Iran was less about toppling the theocratic regime and more about finding a path toward the eventual lifting of economic sanctions on Iran. “I want to use sanctions as little as possible,” Trump said in comments at the Economic Club of New York on Sep. 5, 2024. “You’re losing Iran,” Trump said, referring to the geopolitical impact of sanctions on Iran’s own policy formulations. “I use sanctions very powerfully against countries who deserve it, then I take them off,” Trump added, indicating a possible policy direction toward Iran once he takes office.

The key, however, will be mitigating the circumstances that caused Trump to believe sanctions were necessary to begin with — Iran’s nuclear program. Eric Edelman, a former senior Defense Department official in the Bush administration, recently published an assessment that calls on Trump to push for early negotiations with Iran that would trade the cessation of much, if not all, of its nuclear program for the lifting of sanctions, or else face a US-led attack on its nuclear facilities. What makes such a high-risk strategy attractive to the incoming Trump administration, which will be averse to getting the US bogged down in overseas wars, is the fact that Iran appears ready to engage in meaningful talks regarding its nuclear program. If Trump can take advantage of this window of opportunity, he may at long last be able to find a pathway to the “better deal” he promised in 2018.

https://www.energyintel.com/00000194-4f76-d625-ab9e-dfffbf1c0000

0 thoughts on “Trump’s First 100 Days: Russia and Iran

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *