Assad’s downfall is a big win for Trump. But if he gets greedy, it could be fatal

Trump must seize this opportunity and accept that lasting peace in the Middle East can only be achieved through a comprehensive approach that leaves nobody behind

When, in January, Donald Trump is sworn in for his second, and final, term as president of the United States, he will find a Middle East undergoing tectonic geopolitical shifts that his Israel-firsters and neocon supporters could not have imagined, even in their wildest dreams.

In just 14 months, between 7 October 2023 and 8 December 2024, the region has gone through what in the future might be called a Sykes-Picot 2.0 moment.

Just a century after the arbitrary shaping of its boundaries by European powers during and after the First World War, the implications of the collapse of the Assad family’s rule in Syria could open a similar period of mayhem, as transformative and impactful as the Iranian revolution 45 years ago.

The “axis of resistance” has been disarticulated, to say the least.

Russia has left Syria and, as this piece is drafted, it was not yet clear if it intended to maintain its military facilities on the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and Hezbollah units have withdrawn as well.

Bashar al-Assad’s Syria is apparently now being run by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani.

Lessons from Syria

The first lesson that can be drawn from this latest chapter of Syria’s predicament is that there are good terrorists and bad terrorists – it all depends on whom they target. Jolani is a shining example of how fluid the notion of terrorist can be, depending on the shifting political circumstances.

In the US, Israel and Turkey, Assad’s overthrow was loudly cheered after a 15-year effort to depose him. Only a few people will regret the end of his ruthless regime.

Here is the second lesson taught by the Syrian crisis: dictators are all bad, but some are worse than others, depending on the cause they decide to embrace and the international alignment they opt for. There is no doubt that the Assad family was wrong on both counts.

In Washington, Assad’s collapse is seen as a severe blow to both Russia and Iran. In Tel Aviv, it is seen as a possible game-changer in the almost 50-year-long confrontation between Israel and Iran, and as a potentially fatal blow to the latter’s ambition to become a top regional power.

In Ankara, it is seen as a golden opportunity to create a buffer zone along Turkey’s southern border stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to Iran, to solve once and for all the perceived Kurdish threat, and as a boost to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s alleged ambitions to create a neo-Ottoman role for his country in the area.

In other words, there is an increasing feeling that from this moment onwards, the political balance of the Middle East will be shaped by Israel, Turkey and what remains of Iran’s regional power. As for the Arab countries, at least at this stage, they seem powerless and, in certain cases, livid bystanders. Qatar might be an exception.

A cautionary note: the axis of resistance is strongly weakened, but the resistance – conceived as an opposition to US hegemony in the region and to Israeli plans to erase Palestinian aspiration to self-determination through further invasions and annexations – has not been subdued.

Here, there are further lessons taught by the Syrian crisis: if Arab peoples take up arms against their ruthless dictators, they are rebels; if other Arabs take up arms against their ruthless occupiers, they are terrorists; and the right of self-defence in invading a neighbouring state can be claimed only by a selected number of states, usually those who picked the right cause and international alignment.

If the analysis of the US/Israel/Turkey victory should prove correct and lasting, the top priority for these three countries is avoiding such a brilliant victory  turning into a “catastrophic success”.

Warmongering neocons

Trump could be crucial in avoiding such a risk. He has repeatedly claimed his vision of no more wars around the world. He is a businessman, after all, and war is not usually good for business. Now, the main question is: does Trump’s no more wars vision imply winning them all in the Middle East by achieving a comprehensive peace coherent only with Israel’s and America’s interests, or should we expect something else?

After 8 December 2024, when the Assad regime fell, peace by overwinning could become a great temptation, but Trump would do better to resist it.

During his previous presidency, he promoted an Israel-first policy, quickly emulated by his successor, Joe Biden. Trump’s signature project, the Abraham Accords, practically threw the whole Palestinian cause under the bus (7 October 2023 was a reaction to the plan).

He also withdrew the US from the Iran nuclear deal – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – and adopted a maximum-pressure policy as far as Iran was concerned.

The people he has selected in recent weeks for the top foreign policy and security jobs, with the notable exception of Massad Boulos as his new senior adviser for Middle East and Arab affairs, are either adamant Israel-firsters or trigger-happy, warmongering neocons with views bordering, in some cases, on Islamophobia.

It might be possible that these choices are just simple moves to please some constituencies at home, counting on the fact that Trump will retain the role of ultimate decision-maker irrespective of what his advisers might wish or think.

However, hoping that this latest assumption is correct, and that Trump might consider a different approach, there are three different decisions he would do well to make.

First, he should unlearn, that is reject, the lessons mentioned above. Second, he should keep in mind that until 8 December, there was a long, ongoing war in the region, with different chapters intersecting, overlapping and influencing each other, and now – after Syria – this war is at a crucial watershed, with a huge not-to-be-missed window of opportunity. Third, he should accept that real, fair and lasting peace in the region will be achieved only through a comprehensive approach that does not leave anyone or any cause behind.

If Trump were to take these onboard, he must follow three methodological approaches. Firstly, he should listen carefully to every actor without prejudice by considering all interests and grievances. Secondly, he must not allow anyone to manoeuvre (bamboozle) him again. And finally, he has to be fair in any mediating role, because in the last three decades or so, the US has been anything but an honest broker in the region; and this has been the bigger part of the problem for the lack of peace in the Middle East.

This is how a real superpower should operate, after all.

Angry nuclear powers

The list of what could go wrong in the Syrian aftermath is endless: new waves of refugees; Christians and other minorities persecuted; a cornered Iran which might finally go for a military nuclear option; the awkward Arab-Kurds civil war between pro-Turkish militias and pro-US ones; the renewed hubris provided by the Islamists’ success which could create new internal tensions in Egypt and in the highly fragile Jordan, where the Muslim Brotherhood is on the rise again (a new Arab Spring?); not to mention the long-term risk to Israel.

Finally, there is Lebanon which, after hitting rock bottom, may start digging.

Final advice. The more Vladimir Putin is humiliated in Syria, the less cooperative he might be in Ukraine; and, if Trump or someone around him is toying with the idea of using chaos in western Asia to leverage China by putting at risk its energy supply, he would do better to reconsider it.

The outcome could be three angry and injured nuclear powers (Russia, China, and Iran), more and more bonded with each other.

Wining is healthy, overwinning may be fatal.

https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/assad-downfall-big-win-trump-overwin-fatal