Russia’s Hidden Hand in Libya

The Libyan crisis appears to be coming to a head. Military units belonging to the Libyan National Army (LNA), under the command of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, have swept aside forces loyal to the Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Prime Minister Fayez Serraj, securing all of eastern Libya and positioning themselves for a possibly decisive attack on Tripoli. External support for the two warring parties is split, with the UN, the US, Turkey, NAAlgeria and Qatar supporting the Serraj government, and Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, France and Italy backing Haftar. At the moment, the situation appears to favor Haftar. But a decisive military victory by the LNA over the GNA is not in the best interests of Russia — the one country with an interest in Libya that is not openly taking sides in this fight. Russia seeks a political settlement between Haftar and Serraj that it can leverage for its own economic and geopolitical benefit. By quietly building close ties with both sides in Libya, Russia is putting itself in a position to dominate the political and military conflict there and its future settlement. The West ignores Russia’s hidden hand to its own detriment.

For Russia, the Nato-led intervention in Libya in 2011 that overthrew Muammar Qaddafi was an economic and geopolitical disaster. Not only did Russia lose an important strategic ally in the region, but it cost the Russian economy billions of dollars in lost development and arms sales contracts. Russia then opted to wait on the sidelines as Libya collapsed into chaos and anarchy. While Russia officially supports the UN’s efforts to bring about a political compromise in Libya, it is positioning itself to be able to determine the specific terms and conditions of such an agreement. In 2015, Russia initiated the Contact Group for Intra-Libyan Settlement, allowing Moscow to gradually re-establish political influence through a policy known as “equal rapprochement.” Since the Contact Group was formed, Russia has been actively building close ties with both Haftar’s LNA and Serraj’s GNA.

The current situation in Libya is dominated by military affairs. Most of the weapons and military supplies used by the forces loyal to Haftar’s LNA come via the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. For its part, Russia refuses to officially supply Haftar with military equipment, citing the international arms embargo that has been placed on Libya. However, in practice Russia provides invaluable military support on the margins, which serves as a force multiplier for Haftar, thus magnifying the impact and influence Russia wields. Haftar’s military connection to Russia dates to June 2016, when he met with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Haftar visited Moscow twice in 2018, meeting with Shoigu both times. Russia has also agreed to treat hundreds of wounded soldiers from Haftar’s army in Russia.

But the most important military connection is not directly with the Russian Ministry of Defense, but rather a private connection that the ministry facilitated. During his visit to Moscow in November 2017, Haftar met with Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the private Russian military contracting organization known as the Wagner Group. This initial meeting produced agreements for private military contractors from Wagner to help in securing strategic port and oil installations in eastern Libya — in short, assuring Haftar’s ability to keep the fields producing.

More recently, Western intelligence indicates that up to 300 additional private military contractors from Wagner Group have been dispatched to eastern Libya to train and advise Haftar’s forces in advance of their current offensive. According to these reports, the Wagner Group deployment mirrors similar ones in Syria, where elite Russian commandos were embedded with the contractors to provide critical tailored support as needed. In this manner, Russia doesn’t need to control all of Haftar’s forces — only those operating at the critical point of the battlefield, at a time dictated by Russian advisers based upon information provided by Russian intelligence.

The importance of Wagner Group’s presence in Libya has not been lost on US military commanders concerned with the region. At a Senate Armed Services Committee meeting over his confirmation as the Commander of US Forces in Africa, General Stephen Townsend told the senators that “I have some experience with these groups and specifically the Wagner Group from my time in Syria. I think they concern me greatly.” Townsend’s concerns were echoed by the outgoing Commander of US Forces in Africa, Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, during his testimony before Congress earlier this month. “Russia is also a growing challenge and has taken a more militaristic approach in Africa. By employing oligarch-funded, quasi-mercenary military advisers, Russian interests gain access to natural resources on favorable terms. Russia is more deliberate in Libya as they invoke Qaddafi-era relationships and debts to obtain economic and military contracts. These agreements are aimed at accessing Libya’s vast oil market, reviving arms sales, and gaining access to coastal territories on the Mediterranean Sea, providing Russia closer access to Europe’s southern border,” he said.

As pointed out by Waldhauser, oil is an important factor in Russia’s Libya strategy. When Muammar Qaddafi was forcibly removed from power in 2011, Libya had an unpaid debt to Russia of around $4.5 billion. A key aspect of Russia’s goals in Libya is getting this debt repaid. One way to achieve this is by making inroads into the Libyan oil sector. Russia’s state-owned oil company, Rosneft, signed a framework cooperation agreement with the National Oil Corp. of Libya (NOC) in February 2017 which included the Russian purchase of small amounts of Libyan oil. Russian efforts to invest in Libya’s energy sector have been hampered by instability. However, now that Haftar has secured the eastern oil fields with the help of the Wagner Group and ports are also under his control, the investment picture for Russia may also improve in the future.

Working With Both Sides

While Russia’s support for Haftar seems clear to all, it does not come at the exclusion of the GNA. Prime Minister Serraj visited Moscow in March 2017, and later that year the Russian government allowed the Serraj government to take control of the Libyan Embassy in Moscow and appoint an ambassador of its choosing in keeping with the Russian Foreign Ministry’s policy of “equal rapprochement.” However, turning over the Libyan Embassy to the Serraj government was conditional on representatives of the Haftar government being able to maintain offices in the embassy building as well. The Serraj government has entered into negotiations with Russia over resolving outstanding contracts signed by the Qaddafi regime, in particular a $2.2 billion deal with Russian Railways to construct a rail line between Benghazi and Sirte. This policy is in keeping with Russia’s stated support of the UN efforts to reach a political settlement between Serraj and Haftar as a precursor for holding a general presidential election.

An outright military victory by Haftar is not in Russia’s interests. By pursuing its policy of “equal rapprochement,” Russia is seeking a political solution, not a military one. Russia’s objectives in Libya are primarily economic. There is neither a need nor a desire for a large, permanent Russian military presence in Libya. What Russia wants is access to and influence over Libya’s oil and natural gas, including an inside track on future development projects. It also wants to re-establish its pre-eminent role as a supplier of military weapons to Libya. This can only happen if both parties to the Libyan crisis reach a political settlement that is acceptable to the international community.

By defining the parameters of any political solution in terms of a strong pro-security framework that favors Haftar over Serraj, Russia is trying to tip the scales in favor of Haftar without alienating Serraj. By keeping the lines of communication open to both warring parties, Russia — unlike other countries involved in Libya today — cannot openly be accused of taking sides. As such, Russia retains the kind of diplomatic credibility and viability that will be needed to guide Haftar and Serraj to an eventual political solution. The biggest takeaway from Russia’s balanced approach to resolving the Libyan crisis is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strong desire to reverse the events of 2011 and install a pro-Russian government that advances Russia’s interests at the expense of the US and Nato. In this, Russia simply wants to re-establish what it sees as the international status quo with respect to Libya that existed before 2011. Although this may be seen in the West as a Russian grand strategy to outflank the US and Nato in the Mediterranean, that is not the goal of Russia’s hidden hand in Libya.

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