Ukraine’s Endgame Phase

The situation in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the prospect for a negotiated peace literally defines the term “fluid.” Positions that were once seen as carved in stone have vanished, and relationships that were deemed rock solid have crumbled. The winds of change that have swept through US domestic politics under President Donald Trump, leaving chaos in their wake, have shifted to foreign shores, with no less disruptive an impact. The trans-Atlantic relationship between the US and Nato, once described as a “sacred bond” by former President Joe Biden, is teetering, as the foundation of a common cause that historically held it together erodes with changing US priorities. Amid this geopolitical anarchy, Ukraine, which once had the full support of the collective West, is left confronting the Russian forces that invaded and occupied its land. Western support is now very much in question, with the US realigning its strategic priorities in a manner that appears to favor Russia, and Europe is scrambling to respond. The ability of Ukraine to continue to resist the Russian military under these conditions is also in question. The key question is no longer whether Ukraine can be positioned to defeat Russia, but rather what Ukraine will look like after a peace agreement.

Trump in 2024 ran on a platform that not only emphasized his priority to bring an end to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine but also his ability to achieve this outcome in rapid order upon assuming office. Once Trump took office, however, the enormity and complexity of the challenges attached to his ambition as a peacemaker prompted a more realistic approach, with former projections of a 24-hour solution predicated on a single phone call evolving into 100-day plans requiring diplomatic engagement on multiple fronts.

For much of his election campaign and during the first three weeks of his presidency, Trump’s Russia policy was largely informed by plans formulated by Keith Kellogg, a retired US Army Lieutenant General whom Trump had appointed as his special envoy for the Ukraine conflict. Kellogg’s strategy for bringing Russia to the negotiating table was based largely on a paper he wrote for the America First Policy Institute in April 2024, America First, Russia & Ukraine. The analysis contained in this paper was derived from sources that could be characterized as sympathetic to Ukraine. Kellogg’s plan, as per the April paper, referenced Russia being offered limited sanctions relief in exchange for abiding by a ceasefire and a demilitarized zone and participating in peace talks. Ukraine would in turn agree to pursue diplomacy to regain its territory but on the understanding that progress here wasn’t likely until a post-Putin Russia. Nato membership would be delayed, but the plan called for the US to establish “a long-term security architecture for Ukraine’s defense that focuses on bilateral security defense.” After Trump’s electoral victory, elements of Kellogg’s “peace plan” were leaked to the press to test the waters in terms of a reaction from Russia. Moscow dismissed the proposals out of hand.

The Witkoff Plan

The rejection of the Kellogg plan by Russia detrimentally impacted the Trump White House’s plans to end the conflict. This hurdle was bypassed when, on Feb. 11, Steve Witkoff, Donald Trump’s special envoy for the Middle East, flew to Moscow to negotiate the return of Marc Fogel, a US citizen who had been imprisoned on drug charges.

While in Moscow, Witkoff met with President Vladimir Putin and Kirill Dmitriev, the CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund. The meeting was set up with the help of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, with Russian President Vladimir Putin underscoring the importance of the Saudi role in this regard. The details of Witkoff’s interactions with Putin and Dmitriev have not been made public, but these meetings appear to have triggered a major change in emphasis by Trump on Russia toward focusing on a broader range of issues, including improved diplomatic and economic relations while deemphasizing the specifics of a Ukraine-Russia peace deal.

On Feb. 13, Trump and Putin spoke for the first time since Trump was sworn in as president. Over the course of their 90-minute talk, the Kellogg peace plan was laid to rest, replaced by what can, for all intents and purposes, be called the Witkoff Plan. The stage was set for a meeting between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in Riyadh on Feb. 18. The heads of the US and Russian intelligence services were also present, as were close advisers on national security to both Trump and Putin. But the unspoken stars of the Riyadh meeting were Witkoff and Dmitriev, whose focus on broad strategic economic issues, including energy security, helped define the direction Russia and the US would take coming out of that meeting.

Left at the Altar

The Riyadh meeting proved to be a slap in the face for the US’ European allies, who not only expected but in fact demanded, a seat at the table. It was also an insult to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who had expended a tremendous amount of effort over the years to make the mantra “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine” a centerpiece of European and US diplomacy on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. While the Kellogg peace plan had been predicated on this precept, the Witkoff Plan ignored it altogether.

To make matters worse, in the leadup to the Riyadh meeting, Trump had dispatched US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Vice President JD Vance to engage with Nato and the EU on the issue of Ukraine and the pathway to peace with Russia. Hegseth articulated a new US posture vis-a-vis Russia that represented a complete departure from the Kellogg Plan, including declaring that Ukraine would never be a member of Nato, that Ukraine would have to make large territorial concessions to Russia “based upon reality” and that the US would not participate in any post-conflict peacekeeping force in Ukraine. These new policy points appear to have emerged from Trump’s conversation with Putin.

Even more dramatic was Vance’s appearance at the Munich Security Conference, a long-standing platform to promote the US-European strategic partnership. Instead of working from past policy templates, Vance engaged in a pointed criticism of Europe that questioned whether the US and Europe were in alignment on issues that went beyond Russia, including foundational matters such as democracy and freedom.

The results of the Hegseth-Vance intervention were cataclysmic. With both Europe and Ukraine in effect abandoned at the altar by the US, the premise on which the trans-Atlantic partnership was built was thrown into question, including its most modern manifestation, Ukraine. A series of emergency meetings between European leaders only underscored the continent’s disarray when confronted by a world void of a US security and policy backstop.

Equally contentious was the spat that developed last week between Zelenskiy and Trump. After Zelenskiy said the talks in Riyadh were taking place “behind Ukraine’s back,” Trump blamed Ukraine for starting the war — and exchanges deteriorated from there, prompting sharp rebukes from Trump’s team and leading to Trump questioning the legitimacy of Zelenskiy as the leader of Ukraine.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict appears to be in its endgame phase. Rather than relying on a carefully scripted negotiation designed to limit Russia’s post-conflict influence, the final chapter of this tragic war seems to have been conceived in haste and anger, to the detriment of Europe and Ukraine alike. While the final paragraphs are still unwritten, as things stand, it appears they will be written in a way that benefits Russia and the US exclusively, leaving Europe and Ukraine in the lurch.

https://www.energyintel.com/00000195-3830-d02f-a9bf-78b7c4580000