Brics vs. US Sanctions

The 18th Brics Summit, held on Sep. 12–13 at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi, India, was convened under the theme “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.” The crowning achievement of the summit was the adoption of a unanimous New Delhi Declaration — a 140-paragraph document — which, among other things, framed Brics as an important voice for the Global South and criticized unilateral tariffs, sanctions and protectionism. While the document went out of its way not to single out the US by name, many of its criticisms clearly touched on US policies. Six days after the New Delhi Declaration was adopted, US President Donald Trump signed into law the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which grants the president the authority to impose tariffs of up to 100% on the top five importers of Russian crude oil and natural gas and codifies a broader package of sanctions against Russia. At a time when global energy markets are reeling under the strain imposed by ongoing conflicts between both the US and Iran and Russia and Ukraine, the looming clash over the viability of US sanctions is set to stress the system even more.

The New Delhi Declaration condemns “unilateral coercive measures that are contrary to international law” and the UN Charter. It singles out “unilateral economic sanctions and secondary sanctions,” stating that they have far-reaching negative effects on human rights, development, health and food security, disproportionately harm the poor and vulnerable, and should be eliminated. It also objects to unilateral tariffs and nontariff measures inconsistent with World Trade Organization rules. The text does not name the US and makes no specific reference to the Russia-Ukraine war. It does, however, address escalating tensions in the Middle East and West Asia, calling for restraint, protection of civilians and the continued flow of global trade and energy.

The Graham Act takes a markedly different approach. Within 30 days of enactment, the president “shall” increase duties, to a rate of up to 100%, on goods imported from qualifying countries. A country is covered if it was among the five largest importers by volume of Russian-origin crude or natural gas in the prior 12 months, and either makes new purchases 30 days or more after enactment or ranks among the top five facilitators of Russian oil-sanctions evasion. The top five list must be updated every 180 days. There is a limited natural gas exception for countries whose Russian gas imports are under 15% of Russia’s total gas exports and that are taking significant steps to reduce those imports. The act also imposes or mandates a range of sanctions targeting Russian officials, banks, energy interests and the “shadow fleet” of tankers used to circumvent sanctions, plus tariffs of up to 500% on goods from Russia itself. The act also extends certain Iran sanctions. Presidential discretion exists over tariff rates and waivers within the framework established by the law.

Consensus vs. Law

The New Delhi Declaration is a 140-paragraph political document produced by consensus. It has no enforcement mechanism, no joint retaliation clause and no legal force of its own. Its practical follow-through includes ongoing Brics efforts on local-currency financing and cross-border payment systems. But whether it results in policy changes — including moves to exert counterpressure on the US — will depend on decisions by individual Brics governments.

By contrast, the Graham Act is grounded in US law. It passed with large bipartisan margins — 86-11 in the Senate and 262-159 in the House — and creates a series of statutory requirements for the executive, alongside presidential rate-setting and waiver authorities. Implementation can begin quickly; several provisions require action within 30 days of the law’s Sep. 18 enactment.

China and India together account for the large majority of Russian crude exports— about 50% and 36%, respectively, of Russia’s crude exports since December 2022, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air — while Turkey accounts for a much smaller share. Those three countries — two of them Brics members that helped draft and unanimously endorsed the New Delhi Declaration, the third a Nato member — are among the countries most exposed to the “top five importers” trigger if they continue new purchases after the grace period. Some European pipeline-gas buyers could also appear on the gas list, although the 15% exception may shield several of them.

The New Delhi Declaration amounts to a collective rejection by Brics members — which include sanctioned states Russia and Iran, as well as major Russian energy customers China and India — of the kind of unilateral secondary sanctions embodied in the Graham Act. The question now is what, if anything, the affected parties will do in the face of the newly expansive sanctions regime created by the US?

A Battle of Will

The New Delhi Declaration is a general rejection of unilateral secondary measures. The Graham Act is narrowly drafted around energy-revenue flows that support Russia during its war in Ukraine and is limited, by rule of construction, to the named categories of countries. Moreover, the Graham Act allows tariffs on all goods that targeted countries sell to the US rather than merely their energy trade, potentially creating a much broader economic impact than conventional sectoral energy sanctions.

Brics has no comparable counter-instrument in the declaration.

The Graham Act builds in a 180-day reassessment and explicit incentives to drop off the top five list or reduce purchases of Russian oil and gas. The New Delhi Declaration contains no comparable operational pathway to counter the sanctions other than framing certain unilateral and secondary sanctions as violations of the UN Charter and international law, while the Graham Act establishes sanctions and tariff powers under US law.

The two texts, issued six days apart, represent competing claims about the legitimacy of using economic coercion against third countries that trade with Russia. The two initiatives are on a collision course, and implementation decisions in the coming weeks — including whether and how the Trump administration applies the new tariff authorities to China and India, and how China and India, rather than Brics itself, respond — will determine how sharp the collision will be.

Reality vs. Politics

At the end of the day, both documents are highly political in nature. One — the New Delhi Declaration — reflects the emergence of a more multipolar international system and a desire among Brics members to reduce their exposure to US economic power. The other — the Graham Act — uses access to the US market to increase pressure on Russia and countries that continue to buy its energy. Its full implementation could disrupt trade and energy flows at a time when global markets are already strained, while potentially raising costs for US consumers and businesses — the exact opposite of the direction the Trump administration wants to be heading in ahead of critical midterm elections in November.

But the Brics response is largely down to what choices India and China make. India has made it clear that its energy sourcing decisions are driven by national interest and the need to ensure energy security for its 1.4 billion people. New Delhi has also warned Washington that the legislation could have implications for bilateral relations and global energy markets. China likewise has rejected US secondary sanctions targeting its trade with Russia and said it reserves the right to take measures to protect Chinese interests. Beijing has successfully applied pressure on the US in the past by squeezing exports of its rare earths and critical minerals.

The extent to which Trump will aggressively seek to implement the range of sanctions tools Congress has given him remains to be seen, and how the administration uses those powers — particularly against China and India — will determine whether the Graham Act becomes primarily a source of negotiating leverage or the trigger for a much broader confrontation over Russian energy trade.

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