Moscow’s Conditions for Peace: Between Diplomacy and Force

Dear Readers, as you know my interpretation of the Ukrainian “peace negotiations” is substantially different from that of the official narrative.  I decided to ask experts in Russia for an explanation of what the Russian view of the “peace negotiations’ is.  Ivan Andrianov, the director of a strategic consulting firm, has obliged me with an answer.  Here it is:

Moscow’s Conditions for Peace: Between Diplomacy and Force

By Ivan Andrianov, Founder and CEO of IntellGlobe Solutions (https://igs.expert/), a strategic consulting firm specializing in geopolitical risk analysis, international security, and political forecasting. Editor-in-Chief of GEOFOR (https://geofor.ru/), an international analytical platform focused on global affairs.

Despite numerous statements, primarily coming from Western media and politicians, today it cannot be unequivocally stated that the Russian authorities are seriously considering the possibility of freezing the conflict with Ukraine along the current line of contact.  Russian politicians, as well as public and behind-the-scenes experts view such a scenario with extreme skepticism.

If we carefully study the Russian media field and the statements of officials everything is essentially reduced to the position set out by President Putin last June at the board meeting of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

It envisions clearing Ukrainian troops from the territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR), as well as the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, which became part of Russia in 2022 after local referendums. Putin stressed that Ukrainian forces must withdraw beyond the administrative borders of those territories as recorded on maps of the former Ukrainian SSR at the time of the Soviet Union’s dissolution.

There have been no recent reinterpretations or statements from the Russian president that would indicate a shift in Moscow’s position. This remains consistent with the Kremlin’s reiterated assertions that it is prepared to engage in negotiations with the United States regarding a peace settlement in Ukraine, or even directly with Kyiv — and notably, without any preconditions. However, the negotiation process itself is inherently protracted, and its eventual outcome remains uncertain. 

The negotiations have been ongoing for several months, and it is evident that the Russian authorities continue to adhere to their core demands. There appears to be little reason to anticipate any fundamental shift in this position, and a number of factors – both direct and indirect – serve to reinforce this assessment.

To begin with, the map of Ukraine’s partition along the Dnieper – recently published on the basis of an interview with U.S. presidential envoy Kellogg – leaves part of the Kherson Region’s right bank under Kiev’s control and has caused considerable bewilderment within Russian diplomatic and expert circles. The same reaction is provoked by the idea of handing the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant and adjacent territories – currently part of the Russian Federation – over to Kiev.

Beyond that, the Russian leadership clearly takes into account public and troop moods, which is strongly influenced by reports of war crimes against civilians in the temporarily occupied areas of Kursk Region that surfaced after their liberation, as well as regular shelling of civilian targets. Official information – highly rationed – together with private-channel reports has reinforced, in the military and, more importantly, in society, a sense of righteous anger and the desire to achieve total victory over the enemy.

Sociological surveys and reports from individuals – military experts, soldiers on leave, volunteers, and so on – returning from the combat zone point to this. It is also noted that the number of people wishing to sign contracts with the Armed Forces has risen markedly of late.

One must also remember the series of terrorist attacks periodically thwarted by Russian security services, as well as those, unfortunately, carried out. Kiev regime recently assassinated Lieutenant-General Yaroslav Moskalyk, Deputy head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff. As the general left his home, a car parked opposite the entrance exploded. The Russian citizen who prepared the bomb was detained the next day and immediately brought to Moscow. During interrogation he testified that he had acted on instructions from Ukrainian intelligence, for whom he was an agent, and that the device was detonated via a cellular signal from Kiev.

It was officially announced that the vehicle had stood there for over a week, suggesting that, beyond the usual aim of terrorizing the public, this act was timed to coincide with another visit to Moscow by U.S. presidential envoy Witkoff, in order to complicate the forthcoming talks.

Notably, the secretary of the Verkhovna Rada’s National Security Committee, Mr. Kostenko, acknowledged Ukraine’s involvement in the assassination of a Russian general and further stated that any ceasefire should be used by Ukrainian special services to carry out new attacks against Russia’s political and military leadership

In this context, the majority of experts agree that under such conditions, the likelihood of President Putin agreeing to any compromise involving the cession of territories formally enshrined as part of the Russian Federation is virtually nonexistent, as such a move would be met with extremely negative reactions both among the Russian public and within the armed forces.

Among other issues, Kursk Region has just been fully liberated and can no longer be used by Kiev as a bargaining chip. Russia, on the other hand, holds territories in Kharkov and Sumy regions that are not formally incorporated into Russia, and potentially in Dnepropetrovsk Region, from which, at various points, Russian troops are only two to five miles away and are still advancing. Some experts believe that, if necessary, these areas could be traded for something in negotiations with Kiev. At the same time, there have been no official statements – or even indirect indications – from the Russian leadership suggesting the possibility of such a scenario.

Overall, there remains deep skepticism within Russia regarding the prospects of reaching a genuine agreement through negotiations with Ukraine, even with U.S. mediation.

While welcoming White House efforts toward peace, experts note the limited ability of the Trump administration to compel Kyiv and its European sponsors not only to cease hostilities but even to make a decision to begin serious negotiations. Against the backdrop of Washington’s and Moscow’s efforts, EU countries continue to give Kyiv political and financial support and to supply weapons, military equipment, and ammunition – though in recent days there has been some shift in their rhetoric regarding the possibility of initiating a negotiating process.

It is generally noted that even if the Russian and U.S. sides reach a mutually acceptable agreement (a scenario considered quite likely in Russia), it is unlikely to be implemented because of Kiev’s provocative actions, carried out with the consent and support of Europeans – primarily the British, French, and Poles. Incidentally, the talks on Ukraine in London effectively failed.

In this regard, it is important to note that, according to several military experts, Kiev is currently finalizing preparations for a major provocation along the front line – something that Ukraine’s military leadership is, in fact, not attempting to conceal.

According to Ukrainian media and bloggers, a reserve force of about 50-70 thousand people have now been formed. Given Kiev’s previous operations of a similar nature, the version suggesting that these forces will be deployed not to reinforce front-line units, but rather to carry out a politically oriented provocation appears entirely plausible. Similar incidents have already taken place, including in Russia’s Kursk and Belgorod regions. It can be also stated with high confidence that it will be reinforced by foreign mercenaries (official Russian Defense Ministry figures indicate that nearly 2,000 Poles were killed and identified in fighting in Kursk Region this year alone, not counting citizens of other countries, total amount of the foreign mercenaries killed in the Region is about 5,000).

Ukrainians also report a shortage of tanks and other armored vehicles. As for drones and ammunition for artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems, these are still available in sufficient quantities.

Taking all of the above into account, the prevailing view in Russia is that the hot phase of the Special Military Operation is likely to continue in one form or another into current and even next year. Occasional forecasts that the operation might conclude this year are still seen as “overly optimistic” and incompatible with the balance of forces on the battlefield and with how the negotiation process is proceeding.

In practice, to maintain political stability and resilience, the Russian authorities must present the populace and the security sector with something that resembles victory in one form or another, as a capitulation of the opponent is not in prospect. The configuration of such a “victory” could include the following essential points: legal recognition of Crimea, de facto recognition of the four regions as part of Russia (Russians would likely pay little heed to the legal niceties), and the lifting of sanctions. Naturally, Moscow would not be satisfied with transferring the Zaporozhe NPP to Ukraine, even under U.S. control, nor with giving up the Kinburn Spit.

Overall, this aligns with Peskov’s statements that “in Trump’s understanding of the situation in Ukraine there are many elements that coincide with Russia’s position.” However, several issues remain. These include the part of Kherson Region on the right bank of the Dnieper with the city of Kherson, and also part of Zaporozhe Region with its administrative center. As it appears at this stage, Kiev categorically opposes transferring these territories to Moscow, creating a serious contradiction. Moreover, the Kremlin is sure to demand limits on the size of the Ukrainian army and a prohibition on any European or NATO military contingents being stationed in Ukraine.

Furthermore, even if some agreement is reached, it is unclear how it would be preserved after Donald Trump’s presidential term expires, especially if the Democrats return to power – something Moscow considers quite a likely scenario.

Moreover, there is currently no clear and reliable mechanism for monitoring the observance of any potential ceasefire. This concern is further reinforced by the previous attempt at a truce during the Easter period, which demonstrated that, even if the Kiev authorities expressed an intention to engage in a ceasefire, they exercised limited control over their military forces, who did not consistently comply with the orders issued. 

It will be interesting to see how the ceasefire is observed in May, especially since Kiev now has ample time to prepare.

Returning to Russian society, most experts agree that it expects the fulfillment of the demands articulated by President Putin prior to the launch of the Special Military Operation, namely:

• Demilitarization, that is, as far as we can judge now, a serious reduction in the size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;

• Denazification, that is the complete dismantling of Ukrainian authority and its replacement by military or diplomatic means;

• Elimination of the NATO threat, which would presumably include recognition of the four new regions and the points mentioned above;

• Retention by Russia of the territories incorporated after the referendums;

• The lifting of sanctions remains a key expectation among both Russian society and business circles.

This is the minimum program, while the maximum would be victory over Ukraine in the classical sense of the word – that is, Kiev’s capitulation. The Kremlin surely understands this as well.

Regarding the ceasefires – which the Russian authorities have now initiated for the second time, effectively on a unilateral basis – they appear to serve several purposes. First, there is the humanitarian dimension. President Putin’s emphasis on humanitarian considerations is subject to both criticism and support: some believe in the sincerity of this approach, others do not; yet it remains a factor that is difficult to ignore, although a number of experts criticize such initiatives.

Second, it appears that Moscow is attempting to leave itself a fallback option if negotiations on Ukraine become completely deadlocked or fail altogether. The Kremlin remains open to a diplomatic resolution of the conflict, but if the proposed terms are deemed wholly unacceptable – and if temporary ceasefires are systematically violated by the Kyiv authorities – this could provide the Russian leadership with the necessary justification to withdraw from negotiations and intensify military operations on what it would argue are legally defensible grounds. Judging by the pressure reportedly being applied by the U.S. administration on President Zelensky, it seems that the White House is also aware of this dynamic.

Therefore, although the Russian authorities are not opposed to resolving the conflict by diplomatic means, Moscow today strongly doubts the realism of such a scenario, and the reason is not Trump himself or the work of his administration, but who will come to power afterward. And of course we must not forget that Kiev and the EU are doing everything today to ensure no agreements are reached, so it is logical to expect that even if an agreement is achieved, it will inevitably be derailed. Making major concessions in such a situation would, as it seems, be political suicide for Russian authorities. In any case, there are definite signals to that effect.

Moscow’s Conditions for Peace: Between Diplomacy and Force