TheAltWorld On Structural Multipolarity
If we look at the state of the modern international system, we can undoubtedly conclude that it is in a transitional stage, with processes of transformation affecting the economy, politics, geopolitics, legal norms, and even religions. That said, there was also talk of a transitional period in the 1990s, when the bipolar system collapsed.
What are the fundamental differences between the current transition and the previous one, and where is the system heading? Western countries are now talking about the need to preserve a “rules-based order,” which they trace back to the end of World War II and the emergence of the Bretton Woods model of the international economy.
This position clearly shows that the previous transition period did not concern this Western-centric order, but was aimed at changing the regimes of those countries that were opponents or critics of the capitalist model in economics and liberalism in politics. At that time, the West spoke enthusiastically about the transition from authoritarianism to democracy and offered, or rather imposed, its vision of state structure and international relations. At the same time, the West, especially the US, actively supported autocracies in the Middle East and other regions, if they followed the Washington Consensus policy. These double standards have persisted to this day, as evidenced by the West’s support for Israel’s policy of outright genocide against the Palestinians and its parallel criticism of Russia, which since 2014 has advocated for the protection of the rights of civilians in Ukraine, including the right to speak their native Russian language.
Now the collective West is declaring the threat of revisionism from countries that do not share the collective West’s views on international relations, or more precisely, criticize the practice of neo-colonialism and cultural hegemony, used as a foreign policy tool by the US and its satellites.
Even in the US, officials have begun to talk about a transition to multipolarity and are shaping their new foreign policy in line with this paradigm.
The topic of multipolarity is not a phenomenon of recent years, although Russia’s Special Military Operation has undoubtedly served as a catalyst for this process. There are various theories of multipolarity, some of which emphasize specific criteria, while others are limited to abstract statements. It is necessary to briefly review them for a detailed understanding of these debates, which will shed light on the current picture of the crisis in the international system.
The shortest description of the poles in the international political system was given by American political scientist Richard Rosecrance in 1963: “Multipolar, bipolar, and unipolar international systems may be distinguished as follows: multipolarity is a multi-bloc or actor system; bipolarity is a two-bloc or actor system; unipolarity is a one-bloc or actor system. Unipolarity requires in addition a single directorate of the preponderant bloc” (Rosecrance, p. 234, note 12).
Karl Deutsch and David Singer viewed multipolarity as a means of encouraging major players to cooperate more (Deutsch and Singer, 1964). These two authors argued that the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar system should lead to a decrease in the frequency and intensity of conflicts, and that a multipolar system is characterized by much greater stability than a bipolar one.
There is also a theory of nuclear multipolarity, in which the poles are powers that possess nuclear weapons. However, there are different assessments of this theory. Kenneth Waltz assumed that states are rational actors inclined to minimize risks. Nuclear powers will behave extremely cautiously when dealing with each other because they understand that the price of conflict could be too high. In his view, states with small nuclear capabilities can successfully employ a strategy of deterrence against much more powerful nuclear powers. However, Stephen Cimbala noted that “There is certainly the possibility that, in any multilateral, constrained nuclear proliferation regime, some weapons of medium or intermediate range might have to be included as “strategic” based on their potential effects against likely regional adversaries” (Cimbala, 2019). Frank Whelon Wayman introduced the concept of cluster multipolarity in the mid-1980s. He noted that “A system is power multipolar when capabilities are more evenly distributed than in the power bipolar condition, and when hostility is still high… A system is cluster multipolar when the states are more evenly distributed throughout the space, with many opportunities for intermediaries and many crosscutting loyalties to moderate hostility… Power bipolarity and power multipolarity are mutually exclusive categories” (Wayman, p. 63).
John Mearsheimer proposed two models of multipolarity. In his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, he wrote: “Multipolar systems without a potential hegemon, what I call ‘balanced multipolarity,” are still likely to have power asymmetries among their members, although these asymmetries will not be as pronounced as the gaps created by the presence of an aspiring hegemon. Therefore, balanced multipolarity is likely to generate less fear than unbalanced multipolarty, but more fear than bipolarity” (p. 45). A multipolar system without a potential hegemon is therefore “balanced multipolarity” and aims to preserve power asymmetries among its members. Balanced multipolarity therefore produces less fear than unbalanced multipolarity, but more fear than bipolarity (Mearsheimer, p. 45).
In fact, all of the theorists presented belong to the school of realism or neorealism in international relations. (See my book, Ordo Pluriversalis: The End of Pax Americana and the Rise of Multipolarity).
In the context of the current international situation and the changes taking place, it can be concluded that, in the absence of clear US global hegemony, the situation could improve significantly, as there would be more centers of power. If the disappearance of Washington’s hegemony automatically makes the European Union more independent and sovereign, then, along with Russia and China, we can talk about four poles. With India, there will be five. It is difficult to say how integration will take place in Africa and Latin America, which could potentially become poles of power in the future.
However, how realistic is this? What are the visible criteria for a transition to multipolarity? For example, if all African countries work more intensively on regional integration, does this mean that a pole will be created? There is the African Union, but what is its role in world politics? Is it equivalent to other supranational associations? Can ASEAN be considered a separate pole, based on the demographics of the countries and the participation of the states of this association in the global economy?
In general, behind the creation of a geopolitical world pole, whether one or more, there is a great power that takes responsibility for forming a certain structure, that is, a unique system of power that includes political, ideological (worldview), economic, and military (security) elements that are interconnected through various agreements and formats of interaction. In a bipolar world order, these were obvious. There was the USSR as a great power and the socialist camp, with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in the economy, the Warsaw Pact in defense and security, and a common ideology of Marxism and class struggle. On the other side were the US and the capitalist states. The US dollar was used as the world’s reserve currency, extending beyond Washington’s formal zone of political control. NATO was the main military bloc, although the US had other agreements with Asian, African, and Latin American states that formalized the US military presence around the world.
Consequently, a real pole in international relations is not just a nuclear or great power. For example, Pakistan has nuclear weapons, but it is not a great power and cannot be a pole according to numerous criteria and indicators. A real pole in global geopolitics is a regional or transregional structure where a great power can act as the main driver of processes and a think tank.
It is no coincidence that the question of unipolarity began to be raised even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the change of regimes in Eastern Europe made clear the processes of disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, which was a key element of security in Eurasia. That is why Charles Krauthammer titled his article, “The Unipolar Moment,” which was based on a lecture he gave in Washington in September 1990. Krauthammer allowed for the emergence of multipolarity, but, taking into account Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, he pointed to the real power of the US and warned against internal turmoil in order to maintain its position as the sole pole of power in the world in the future.
Incidentally, Fidel Castro raised a similar question when he first publicly expressed this idea on December 7, 1989, noting that “if certain very negative trends continue, the world will move from bipolarity to unipolarity under US domination.” The Berlin Wall was torn down a month before his warning. And Fidel foresaw a possible further scenario, which was subsequently realized.
The Warsaw Pact ceased military cooperation in February 1991 and was officially dissolved on July 1 of the same year. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ceased to exist on June 28, 1991.
And the Soviet Union ceased to exist in December 1991. It should be noted that initially it was not the main actor of the second pole that disintegrated, but its structural elements in the form of a body responsible for security and another related to the economy.
And nothing similar has been created to replace them. Of course, Russia has become significantly stronger than it was immediately after the collapse of the USSR. On Moscow’s initiative, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union were created, but their effect is rather insignificant compared to what existed during the Soviet era.
At the same time, the dollar’s hegemony remains intact, and most of the world’s banking transactions are conducted in this currency, although there is a practice of settling accounts in national currencies, and the share of the Chinese yuan is gradually growing.
The NATO bloc has grown significantly, mainly due to the accession of former members of the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, its declared goals go far beyond the North Atlantic; it has carried out military intervention in Africa (Libya) and has agreements with countries in the Middle East and Asia.
Therefore, although there is talk of the emergence of multipolarity, in fact, if we look at it from the perspective of structures rather than great powers or supranational associations such as the EU, there is still one powerful pole that was established by the US. And despite the current disagreements between the US and the EU, this model remains in place. Moreover, this pole has become larger and more influential due to the expansion of its structural elements.
China, despite its enormous economic and political successes, cannot offer anything similar to counterbalance the West. The Belt and Road Initiative is not a new version of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, but rather the implementation of part of China’s foreign policy. It is China-centric in nature. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was also conceived by Beijing to advance its own interests, and the presence of India and Pakistan, two countries in constant conflict, suggests that there is no real unity of purpose.
Therefore, from the perspective of structural multipolarity, one can only speak of a certain revival of bipolarity, where Russia is the key player, but this pole functions in a different format and was catalyzed by the special military operation in Ukraine. Moscow’s new agreements with Minsk, Pyongyang, and Tehran have allowed Russia to build a special level of relations with these partner states. The deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus, the participation of DPRK troops in the war in Ukraine, and the supply of necessary equipment from Iran demonstrate a new emerging security model in Eurasia. At the same time, the CSTO and the EAEU are functioning in parallel with this process.
Consequently, if we talk about structural multipolarity, it is virtually non-existent. But it will be necessary to end unipolar hegemony. Therefore, we should not succumb to the illusion of Western politicians’ statements about the advent of multipolarity, one of whom is the new US Vice President, JD Vance. Yes, the US is currently experiencing a number of problems, but its financial agents, in the form of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, continue to work actively to defend the dollar’s hegemony. NATO is increasing its defense spending, and Sweden and Finland have recently been accepted as new members of the alliance.
At the same time, various forms of partnership are being developed outside the North Atlantic, for example with the Republic of Azerbaijan, which indicates NATO’s global interests. Moreover, Serbia, a victim of NATO bombing, also has a number of agreements with this organization, which clearly indicates NATO’s strengthening geopolitical control in Europe.
Nevertheless, Russia’s experience can be applied in other regions, thus creating a more tangible multipolarity. It is hoped that Moscow’s cooperation in Africa and Latin America will give a corresponding impetus to this process. Incidentally, it was no coincidence that Hugo Chávez proposed a defense alliance for Latin American countries, and later Brazil proposed this idea in the form of a Latin American Defense Council. However, this project was never implemented, as the US was well aware of the threat to its interests if an independent geopolitical pole were to be created in the South Atlantic. Let us hope that after the resolution of disputes and contradictions between a number of countries in the region, this idea will nevertheless be implemented in a format necessary for the creation of a full-fledged pole structure, which will be a worthy contribution to the real multipolarity that is taking shape.
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