Washington’s War in Ukraine: Narrowing Options, Growing Consequences

Russia’s use of its Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile in eastern Ukraine represents an unprecedented escalation in what began as a US proxy war against Russia in 2014.

The missile’s capabilities represent a serious non-nuclear means of striking targets anywhere in Europe without the collective West;s ability to sufficiently defend against it.

The possibility of the West now facing direct consequences for what has so far been a proxy war, may reintroduce rational thought across the West otherwise not required when spending the lives of others. It may, however, cause Western policymakers to double down, confident in the belief that they remain decoupled from any possible consequences despite unprecedented escalation.

Fundamentals, Not Wonder Weapons are Winning the War 

The missile’s use is only the latest demonstration of Russia’s military and escalatory dominance amid the ongoing proxy war. It alone would be unable to significantly impact the fighting, but because the Russian Federation over the last two decades has invested deeply in the fundamentals of national defense, it compliments a range of other capabilities serving as a deterrence against continued Western encroachment.

Before the deployment of the Oreshnik, the progress of Russian forces along the line of contact in Ukraine had been accelerating, triggering panic across the capitals of Western nations. This was not achieved through any single “wonder weapon,” but through Russia’s post-Cold War strategy of preparing its military forces and its military industrial capacity to wage a large-scale, prolonged, and intense conflict against Western-backed forces building up along Russia’s borders.

This included the development and large-scale production of both simple and advanced weapons ranging from main battle tanks and other armored vehicles, to drones, cruise missiles, air defense systems, and electronic warfare capabilities.

Because Russia’s arms industry operates under state-owned enterprises prioritizing state needs over generating profit, the systems required in terms of both quality and quantity were made available. This was possible because surplus production capacity had been maintained across a large number of Russian arms production facilities. Excess labor and equipment that would have been slashed by private enterprise across the West to maximize profits was maintained if and when needed. Come February 2022, this excess capacity was utilized and has since been the central factor contributing to Russia’s growing success against NATO-backed forces in Ukraine.

The West, on the other hand, is suffering a growing military industrial crisis. Excess production capacity needs to be built from scratch, taking years or longer. Across the collective West, skilled labor shortages prevent assembly lines from being expanded significantly, even if the will and resources exist to do so. In all areas of production, from air defense missiles to artillery shells, the collective West is struggling to meet even the most meager production targets.

Washington, determined to prevail in Ukraine either outright or through severely overextending Russia amid this proxy war, has steadily escalated the conflict from 2014 when the US overthrew the elected government of Ukraine, to 2019 when the US began arming Ukrainian forces already being trained by NATO, to full-spectrum sanctions on Russia from 2022 onward, to the transfer of artillery, tanks, aircraft, and long-range missiles the US has now finally authorized strikes into Russia itself with.

Each escalation represents an attempt by Washington and its European proxies to inflict prohibitive costs on Russia. As each escalation falls far short of doing so, additional escalations are devised.

Recently, France and the UK have discussed the possibility of sending their own troops into Ukraine as yet another serious escalation of a war the collective West is already all but fighting against Russia directly.

It should be remembered that the US is also engineering crises elsewhere along Russia’s periphery, including Georgia as well as Syria, to similarly overextend Russia. Recent military operations carried out by US-backed extremists in Syria were likely prepared months in advance and launched as a substitute for the Westn’s own inability to overpower Russia in Ukraine.

Narrowing Options, Growing Consequences 

Even without the Oreshnik’s appearance amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, it is clear that the West’s attempts to escalate versus Russia have fallen far short of extending Russia in the manner many Western analysts, politicians, and military leaders have hoped.

The wider geopolitical effect appears to be bolstering rather than undermining the shift from US-led unipolarism toward multipolarism.

Options for escalating are narrowing for the West. The deployment of Western forces in Ukraine would lead to the same problems Ukrainian troops themselves face – a lack of artillery shells, armored vehicles, and air defense systems to protect their forces from the 4,000+ missiles Russia has fired on Ukraine each year.

The Oreshnik itself represents a non-nuclear means of striking at any target either in Ukraine or across the rest of Europe. It would be a means by which to inflict serious damage on European and American military targets in the region, further reducing the West’s already dwindling military power. The missile, like many others in Russia’s growing arsenal, would be able to overcome Western air and missile defenses both because of fundamental flaws in their performance and because Western stockpiles of interceptors have been exhausted with no means of readily replenishing them.

Because the collective West’s military industrial capacity is so limited versus its overreaching pursuit of global primacy, the use of its military aviation, cruise missiles, and other existing capabilities can only be committed in one of at least three primary regions of focus – Europe, the Middle East, or the Asia-Pacific.

Were the US and Europe to commit significant forces to a direct conflict with Russia in Ukraine, even if it fell short of nuclear war, it would exhaust military power the West sought to preserve for potential war with either Iran and/or China. While there would be no guarantee that these capabilities would tilt the conflict in Ukraine back in their favor, it would guarantee that US-European ambitions in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific would be forfeited indefinitely.

It could be that the US seeks to extend its proxy war against Russia in Ukraine across the rest of Europe, with the US itself preserving its military capabilities for its continued involvement in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific. But the conflict in Ukraine has exposed fundamental flaws in the collective West’s system overall. A system incapable of collectively overpowering Russia, having exhausted itself in the process of trying, will have less fortune still overpowering a much larger and more capable China.

While the US may believe it improves its chances by shifting the burden of intervention in Ukraine to its European proxies, the US still suffers from a fundamental inability itself to produce the number of arms and ammunition required to fight a similar conflict in the Asia-Pacific.

The introduction of the Oreshnik, a capability China will also almost certainly be capable of producing if it does not already possess it – represents a further means of deterring the US and its proxies – a promise of non-nuclear consequences in a missile exchange the US and Europe would enter at a disadvantage. This, on top of a large and growing disparity in terms of military industrial capacity, confines US and European options to resorting to nuclear weapons or reformulating a more realistic and constructive foreign policy in the first place.

Because Russia and China possess their own large and growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons – the West’s use of such weapons really isn’t an option. But because the current circles of power in the West lack the military strength, intelligence, and moral fortitude to reformulate their foreign policy, from their point of view, they may believe in the possibility of a limited nuclear war they could emerge from with an advantage, believing this may be their only option. Thus, the notion of mutually assured destruction must be fully impressed upon the West now as it was during the Cold War, reintroducing the fear of personal consequences for policymakers so rational thought unnecessary when spending the lives of others can be reintroduced into the equation.

https://journal-neo.su/2024/11/29/washingtons-war-in-ukraine-narrowing-options-growing-consequences/