Still too early…

Americans beating their chests over sinking a single Iranian warship returning from joint drills with India are missing the point.

Iran has warships. They are useful for specific tasks, valuable, and losing them costs Iran.

But Iran’s strategy for defending itself against a US war of aggression did not include these ships.

It depends on 1000s of small boats with anti-ship missiles and other capabilities to create a naval version of its “mosaic” defense strategy.

Instead of consolidating Iran’s naval capabilities into a handful of large expensive ships easy to track and sink, it has distributed these capabilities across many more, harder to find and target, easier to replace boats.

It remains to be seen how effective Iran’s strategy is – but sinking Iranian warships at dock or in non-combat transit is symbolic, not symptomatic.

https://t.me/brianlovethailand/4641

https://t.me/brianlovethailand/4641

▪️Iranian missiles and launchers: the US and Israel are actively hunting Iranian missile launchers which, if sufficiently neutralized, negates whatever extensive stockpiles of missiles Iran might have.

Iran’s rate of fire has already been on the decease. I hear many reasons why that might be, but one of those reasons might be loss launchers.

This would alleviate pressure on US anti-missile defense munitions and allow the US to extend its war significantly.

However, Iran would still be able to resist with drones and anti-shipping missiles as well as simply resist by maintaining internal stability regardless of US bombing (as Afghanistan and Vietnam did).

Iran will have lost significant leverage to force a shorter war and will then be required to fight on in a much longer one;

▪️US anti-missile munitions: the US and its proxies may run short of anti-missile munitions before mid-March (shorter than they already were).

If Iranian missile and drone strikes continue, even as a trickle, this may lead to an increase in damage to regional US military infrastructure compromising its ability to continue its war.

The depletion of defensive and offensive US weapons also inhibits the many other wars and proxy wars of aggression it is waging or preparing for;

▪️Maintenance wall for US/proxy aircraft: around mid to late March, maintenance requirements will significantly impact sortie rates, forcing either a drop in operational tempo or a major rotation of aircraft into the region including possible rotations of aircraft carriers.

This is might be why the US keeps talking about a “4-5 week operation”;

▪️US-Israeli ISR drones: these are expensive long range drones used to find targets across Iran.

Iran has already shot down dozens of them with Israel likely having around 100-200 of these drones available in total and the US having 200-300 (but not all in theater).

Iran won’t be able to shoot them all down, but continued attrition will also impact operational tempo and effectiveness;

There are other metrics at play.

Modern warfare, especially when an offensive passes from initial momentum to a sort of equilibrium, involves attrition more than simple initiative.

It is still too early to tell regarding any of these metrics.

If the US runs out of anti-missile munitions we will see significantly more damage to US targets.

If Iran runs out of launchers, we will see a steep drop off of ballistic missile launches even after maintenence walls and loss of IRS drones impact US operational tempo hunting those launchers.

Ultimately, the US must either topple the government or use an exit ramp for another pause to win or end its war of aggression this round.

Iran simply has to survive to win this round.

A significantly weakened Iran, however, will need to rebuild and prepare faster than the US for the next round to avoid cumulative attrition and eventual collapse.

The war on Iran is not a war “for Israel.” It is a US war on multipolarism and its result will determine the next phase of US aggression against Russia, China and the rest of the multipolar world.

https://t.me/brianlovethailand/4642