Ending the Infinity War

Israel and the US have launched Operation Roaring Lion/Epic Fury against Iran. Iran has responded with Operation “True Promise 4.” Unlike past conflicts, including the June 2025 conflict, this round of fighting is being framed as existential in nature. When regime change is on the table, there can be only one winner. This round of fighting will forever reshape Middle Eastern geopolitics, one way or another.

The facts, as reported, appear incontrovertible: Israel and the US launched a surprise attack against Iran, whose legality under international law is disputed. These attacks were conducted without a formal declaration of war, or, in the case of the US, without explicit congressional authorization, relying instead on executive action. This legal foundation, or lack thereof, is important when assessing the endgame of this conflict.

The previous military engagements between Israel, the US and Iran in April 2024, October 2024 and June 2025 were widely described at the time as limited operations responding to specific geopolitical triggers, designed to be containable events. Even the June 2025 conflict, which, like the current event, began with a surprise attack, was viewed by policymakers as containable, with the US reportedly playing a central role in brokering an uneasy ceasefire following the US’ bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities and when it became clear the Israeli gambit had not achieved its broader political objectives.

The current conflict is not containable. It is being framed by its protagonists as a war of existential proportions, with hard-liners on both sides articulating maximalist objectives, including either eliminating the government of the Islamic republic of Iran or removing the US military footprint in the Middle East. Anyone believing that their goal could be achieved quickly and with a minimal expenditure of resources may be underestimating the scale and duration such a confrontation typically entails and could ultimately end up on the losing side of the equation when the final balance sheet of this war is tabulated.

This war presents major risks for Israel, the US and the Gulf Arab nations who host US military assets involved in regional operations or are perceived by Tehran as aligned with Washington.

Prior to the conflict, Israeli officials signaled that any renewed confrontation would need to decisively degrade Iran’s governing structure and military capability and that it would need to be of limited duration to remain politically sustainable domestically. Some regional reporting has suggested Israeli officials privately assessed that the conflict must be of a short duration, as they could only absorb the damage of up to 700 missiles, although such claims remain unverified.

Despite public pronouncements of neutrality, several Gulf Arab states host US military facilities that provide intelligence, basing and logistical support capabilities, although their governments have publicly sought to avoid direct entanglement and said their territory has not been used in the current attacks.

‘True Promise 4’

Iran agreed to the US-brokered ceasefire that brought an end to the June 2025 conflict, apparently calculating that it was not prepared for a prolonged, multifront war. Iranian officials subsequently characterized the diplomatic track preceding that conflict as evidence of Western bad faith.

When the June 2025 conflict ended, Iran appears to have drawn operational lessons that informed preparations for a future confrontation. Like Israel and the Gulf Arab states, Iran likely assessed that a prolonged, open-ended cycle of escalation was unsustainable from the standpoint of national survival.

The June 2025 conflict raised questions about the effectiveness of regional missile defense architectures, particularly given the scale and sophistication of missile and drone salvos employed. It also exposed the political and economic strains that an extended confrontation would impose on all parties.

Iran — despite its accusation of Western bad faith — continued to engage indirectly in diplomatic channels, including Omani-facilitated contacts, and reportedly explored confidence-building measures related to its nuclear program. The exact scope of any concessions discussed however remains unclear.

But Iranian officials have long argued that the root causes of the “infinity war” — the risk of an unending confrontation between Israel-US and Iran — lies not in Iran’s nuclear program or its missile program or its relationship with regional actors opposed to Israeli-US policies but the desire to weaken or replace the Islamic republic.

To deter against any effort to act on this policy objective, Iran began preparing immediately after the conclusion of the June 2025 conflict for the resumption of hostilities. But this time, Iran expanded the scope and scale of its preparations to extend well beyond retaliatory strikes against Israel and demonstration attacks against US military installations.

Iran needed to make the price of seeking regime change in Iran so high that the nations who engaged in the execution of such a plan would be compelled to not only cease and desist when it came to attacking Iran but also dismantle the infrastructure that the US had constructed in the region over the course of five decades that sustained such policies. Iran was prepared from the very moment it was attacked by Israel to engage in retaliatory strikes that targeted not only Israel but also the totality of the US military bases in the region and the critical infrastructure of all nations providing support to both the US and Isarael.

The End Game?

While it is still early in the conflict, Iran appears to have maintained military momentum despite high-profile assassinations of senior Iranian military officials and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Claims that regime change objectives have stalled reflect the absence, thus far, of visible elite fragmentation inside Iran.

Moreover, Iran has targeted regional energy and infrastructure, plus threatened maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Any sustained closure of the strait would represent a major escalation; at present, the waterway is all but closed — with ships avoiding it due to insurance risk and increasingly threatening statements from Iranian officials.

Iran appears prepared for a conflict that could extend for months. By contrast, US and Israeli planning assumptions appeared to expect to be able to wrap up operations in days or weeks. The legality of the initial strikes also remains contested, and this issue is likely to shape international diplomatic pressure as economic consequences mount.

The question is whether Gulf Arab states may reassess aspects of their security relationships depending on perceptions of US deterrence credibility; Washington may confront force posture and sustainability challenges if the conflict becomes protracted.

The international community is likely to press for de-escalation, but the Iranian government sees this conflict as an existential threat, so any termination terms would need to reflect that calculation, or the war will not end.

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