Russia’s Long Game in Ukraine

The Ukrainian presidential elections this spring represent a referendum on the future of the nation. For most Western observers, the election pits one corrupt candidate, Petro Poroshenko, the incumbent, against another, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, a television comedian controlled by Igor Kolomoisky, a Ukrainian oligarch known for his corruption. But there is another agenda at play that is largely ignored by the West. It reflects Russia’s Ukraine strategy, and it involves a waiting game that will take more time to play out. A pro-Russian candidate, Yuriy Boyko, ranks fourth in the polls and stands no chance of winning this election. But his presence is indicative of the growing pro-Russian sentiment inside Ukraine that Moscow seeks to exploit in the long term, supplanting the current choice between corrupt politicians with one that has Ukraine opting to realign itself with Russia politically and economically, thereby transforming the geopolitical map of Europe in Russia’s favor.

Some 39 individual candidates are vying for a shot at the Ukrainian presidency on Mar. 31 — including the incumbent, Poroshenko. On the eve of the election, however, Poroshenko is running a distant second to Zelenskiy, the star of a hit TV comedy, “Servant of the People,” where he plays the role of a common citizen that becomes president by fighting rampant corruption. The show runs on the Ukrainian Channel, 1+1, which is owned by the Ukrainian oligarch, Igor Kolomoisky. Zelenskiy’s lack of political experience, combined with the fact that he is completely reliant upon Kolomoisky’s money for his campaign, have led many to believe that he will end up being little more than a mouthpiece for yet another corrupt oligarch. Polls show Zelenskiy’s support at around 25% leading up to the election.

Trailing Zelenskiy, with about 13% support each, are Poroshenko and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Poroshenko has built his campaign around his role in confronting the Russians and fighting corruption. But his administration has been plagued by corruption scandals, and the conflict with Russia remains unresolved. While Poroshenko has opened relations with the West, his record on corruption, as well as his seeming impotence in the face of rising Ukrainian ultranationalism, have soured the West on his viability as a leader. Tymoshenko is viewed by her critics as representing nothing new in Ukrainian politics. Her administration was also marked by excessive corruption, and her candidacy has been supported by Igor Kolomoisky, prompting some observers to opine that she will split the vote in the first round of elections, forcing a runoff between Zelenskiy and Poroshenko, where her supporters would then rally around Zelenskiy, giving him the votes to prevail in the second round, scheduled for April.

The likelihood is that Ukraine will again find itself with a leader who is under the control of a corrupt oligarch that exploits the country’s economy for their benefit, while the people suffer. This outcome has many in Europe worrying about the future viability of the nation. This is why the fourth-place candidate is of great significance. Boyko is the 60-year-old former minister of energy and a onetime ally of ousted President Viktor Yanukovich. Boyko is running on a platform of normalizing relations with Russia, a position that is becoming increasingly popular among a population that has grown tired of war. Many Ukrainians also speak Russian and still have close ties with their former Soviet neighbor.

But even more important than stopping war is the role Boyko could play in revitalizing Ukraine’s moribund economy. While Poroshenko and the other candidates flirt with the West, hoping against hope for eventual inclusion in the European Union, Boyko has locked his eyes on Ukraine’s traditional economic partner, Russia, and, more importantly on Russian gas. Boyko recently met with Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev to discuss the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations. “Bearing in mind that relations between Russia and Ukraine are in a state of deep crisis,” Medvedev explained, “I thought it was right to hold this meeting … because, as is known, the gas agreement expires this year, and it is necessary to decide what to do next.” The issue of Russian gas supply to Ukraine is one in which Boyko has considerable experience, as the minister of energy for Ukraine in 2010, Boyko led negotiations with Russia that resulted in a 30% cut in the price Ukraine paid for Russian gas.

Russian gas is of critical importance. Not only is Ukraine dependent upon Russian gas for its energy needs, but its economy is dependent upon the billions of dollars in transit fees that Russia pays every year for exporting gas to Europe. While Ukraine has shown that it can negotiate short-term alternative gas supply arrangements with its European neighbors, there is nothing that can replace the income derived from transit fees. Denied these, the Ukrainian economy would collapse.

The current agreement between Ukraine and Russia concerning the transit of gas expires at the end of this year. The Ukrainian government claims that Russia has no intention of negotiating a new contract, with Gazprom having informed its partners that it plans to stop transiting gas through Ukraine starting in 2020 — coincidentally the same time frame that the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project linking Russia with Germany is anticipated to come on line. The reality, however, is far different. Russia has repeatedly committed to wanting to continue its contract with Ukraine to supply gas, anticipating a resolution sometime in May 2019 or, failing that, later in October. Russian President Vladimir Putin has weighed in on the issue, stating clearly that Russia desires to keep the transit arrangement in place.

The threat of completely stopping Russian gas supplies to Ukraine is Moscow’s trump card but it can only be played once. If Russia’s goal is to empower a pro-Russian candidate to prevail in Ukrainian presidential elections, then this card must be played at a decisive moment, the precise timing of which is virtually impossible to predict. A better strategy — and the one Russia appears to be taking — is to maximize the importance of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine and hold the threat of a total gas embargo over the heads of the Ukrainians in perpetuity. In a world where gas supply is becoming increasingly competitive, the major advantage that Russia holds over its competitors is the ability to deliver massive quantities of gas at competitive prices reliably over time. Cutting off supplies to Ukraine would harm its commercial position with all of its customers, but the threat of cutting off supplies to Ukraine can still be used as a powerful lever.

Moscow’s caution about cutting off supplies of gas to Ukraine does not mean that Russia wants to make the Ukrainian economy viable — far from it. Russia’s entire strategy toward Ukraine hinges on creating the conditions for economic collapse, which will in turn lead a political collapse of the anti-Russian element in the Ukraine. The virtual blockade of Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov by Russia is an example of Russian actions designed to achieve this economic objective. So too is the continuation of hostilities in the Donbas, which saps the will of the Ukrainian people, inhibits foreign investment in Ukraine, and empowers Ukraine’s ultranationalist minority in a way that undermines Ukraine’s relations with the West.

All of these actions are part and parcel of a concerted effort designed to undermine the economy and the government that is likely to emerge from the current election, paving the way for the eventual election of a pro-Russian government whose legitimacy is undisputed in Ukraine and in the West. Once such a government is in place, Russia will trade the rebuilding of the Ukrainian economy, and the cessation of hostilities in the Donbas, for Ukrainian recognition of the Russian annexation of Crimea. This is the step that Russia desires the most. Once Ukraine, of its own volition, recognizes Russian sovereignty over the Crimea, it will be much more difficult for the West to sustain its sanctions on Russia.

While Boyko has no chance of prevailing in the 2019 presidential election, his candidacy underscores the reality that a Ukrainian pivot back toward Russia is not as unthinkable as it was in the aftermath of the 2014 unrest that unseated Yanukovich. Indeed, the entire premise of Russia’s strategy is predicated on such a pivot by Ukraine back toward Russia. Without access to Russian gas, the Ukrainian economy, corrupt or otherwise, will collapse. The Russians know this, which is why Medvedev’s comments on his meeting with Boyko are so important. At the end of the day, it is Russian gas, and the extreme leverage it holds over the Ukrainian economy, that will be the determining factor when it comes to Ukraine’s political future. In Moscow’s game plan, the candidate who can best guarantee Ukraine’s access to Russian gas and remove the threat of a supply cutoff will become the people’s choice. That won’t happen in this election, that is certain. But if Russia has its way, then perhaps the next … or the next after that. Russia is playing a long game in Ukraine, and it is playing to win.

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