India-China Border Dispute Deepens Amid Mutual Mistrust

Over the past five years, India and China have been engaged in intensive diplomacy intended to resolve a volatile border dispute in the Kashmir region of the Himalayan mountains. The desire for a peaceful resolution of this border dispute, however, is complicated by India’s fractious relationship with neighboring Pakistan and China’s ongoing support of Pakistan. Another wrinkle is India’s desire to maintain good relations with the US as Washington simultaneously stakes out a more aggressive position toward China. Seen in this light, the India-China border dispute will likely continue to fester and could lead to a possible resumption of open hostility such as was last experienced in 2020.

The recent fighting between India and Pakistan over the disputed Kashmir territory has cast a spotlight on the other major land dispute in the region, namely the tense standoff between China and India along what’s known as the Line of Actual Control that serves as the de facto border between the two nations in the Indian-administered territory of Ladakh, near Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin. A Jun. 26 meeting between Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and his Chinese counterpart, Dong Jun, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) defense minister’s summit called for “bridging the trust deficit” between the two nations. A bloody confrontation between Indian and Chinese troops in 2020 in the Galwan Valley that killed 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers widened the gap between the long-standing regional rivals.

In the five years since that incident, there have been more than 20 commander-level talks at which issues such as force disengagement and patrol management have been hammered out. However, the SCO meeting was the first between defense ministers since the Galwan Valley incident, reflecting the reality that the situation remains “complicated,” a sentiment expressed by a Chinese spokesperson, who, in a statement issued after the defense minster’s meeting, expressed hope that the two nations would “continue to stay in communication on relevant issues, and jointly keep the border areas peaceful and tranquil.”

The face-to-face meeting of Indian and Chinese defense ministers, however, took place in the context of an SCO summit that failed to produce a joint statement in large part because of Indian objections to language that refrained from condemning Pakistan for its role in the April 2025 terrorist attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir. This attack triggered a series of military engagements between India and Pakistan that took the two nuclear-armed nations to the brink of open war. Moreover, given the close coordination between China and Pakistan on military matters, including China’s provision of advanced J-10 fighters to Pakistan, there is a growing concern in India over an alleged hidden Chinese hand behind Pakistan’s more militant posture over the disputed Kashmiri territories.

India’s Diplomatic Snub

The SCO was formed in June 2001, bringing five nations (Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) together under a platform built around core principles of mutual trust, equality, respect for cultural diversity and a desire for common development. In the aftermath of the Sep. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US, the SCO embraced a collective anti-terrorism posture. It was in this light that India and Pakistan, along with Iran and Mongolia, applied for observer status in the SCO in 2005. In 2010, with the US-led conflict in Afghanistan in full swing, both India and Pakistan applied for full membership status. This was approved in 2015, and in 2017, both nations became full members of the SCO.

In theory, bringing Pakistan and India together under the SCO umbrella would serve to narrow the difference between these two regional nuclear-armed powers. The reality, however, was far different. Pakistan and India were not cooperating in the anti-terror campaign being waged in Afghanistan — far from it. India viewed Afghanistan as a containment vehicle for Pakistani expansion, given Islamabad’s strategic posture of viewing the Pashtun territories of Afghanistan as part of its strategic depth against India. Moreover, while India supported the US-allied Afghan government, Pakistan provided support to various groups aligned with the Afghan Taliban and other militant Islamic groups — including several involved in supporting attacks against India in the contested Kashmiri territories.

Pakistani and Indian membership in the SCO was never about collaboration between the two nations but rather about maintaining mutual checks and balances on each other. Here, Pakistan’s close relations with China created problems for India, which saw its regional clout dissipate as China promoted Pakistani economic development and geopolitical prominence. The recent impasse over the issuing of a joint statement at the SCO summit is a manifestation of India’s growing frustration with what it perceives to be Chinese-dominated multilateral institutions.

At the recently concluded Brics summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, India was likewise frustrated by the failure of the organization to name Pakistan as the perpetrator of the April 2025 terror attack in Kashmir. Instead, language in the joint statement was limited to a more neutral condemnation of the attack, without naming a perpetrator. This snub stung hard, given the fanfare that was made over what has turned out to be an abortive rapprochement between India and China reached on the sidelines of the 2024 Brics Summit in Kazan, Russia.

But for India, the diplomatic sting over the Kashmir attack was not just limited to forums where China has a leading role, such as the SCO and Brics, but also Western-tilting forums like the Quad, a security dialogue that groups together the US, Japan, Australia and India as a means of containing Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific. While the US pushes for a more aggressive posturing by the other three Quad members when it comes to countering China, the US continues to view Pakistan as a strategically important regional partner, and as such blocked any statement coming out of the Quad that singled Pakistan out as the perpetrator of the April 2005 Kashmir terror attack, according to Indian press reports.

A Difficult Road Ahead

The issue of Pakistan looms large in the background of India’s difficult relationship with China, especially when it comes to resolving the contentious border dispute in Ladakh. The Galwan Valley holds strategic importance due to its proximity to the Siachen Glacier, home of a major concentration of India’s military forces, and the Karakoram Pass, which connects Ladakh, India, with Xinjiang, China. Control of the Galwan Valley is essential for both surveillance and access purposes. Both India and China have been investing heavily in infrastructure development in the region, including the construction of roads, bridges and military installations.

The situation is further complicated by the presence of other territorial disputes in the region, including the Siachen Glacier itself, the Doklam plateau and the Depsang Plains. The Depsang Plains is of particular strategic importance, as Chinese control there would endanger India’s position on the Siachen Glacier, threatening Indian forces stationed there with encirclement from both China and Pakistan.

Further complicating Indian-Chinese relations is the tense atmosphere between the US and China, where the rhetoric from the US has become increasingly militaristic. The recent US bombing of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure was condemned by China, which, along with Pakistan, also signaled broad rhetorical — if not material — support for Iran. All of this complicates matters for India, which has sought to maintain a foot in both the US and Russia-China multilateral camps. Instead of rewarding India for its restraint in promoting policies in the SCO and Brics that could be construed as anti-US in character, the Trump administration has been indifferent to Indian diplomatic priorities while punishing India on trade issues. And in the end, China will be wary of making any concessions to India regarding the border dispute between Ladakh and Aksai Chin so long as it perceives India as being an extension of US anti-Chinese posturing.

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