Afghanistan’s Uncertain Future

Internal Opposition to the Taliban Is Growing

In late August, the United Front of Afghanistan announced that at least 180 Afghan religious figures, Islamic scholars, and researchers had issued a fatwa supporting war or armed action against the Taliban. According to the Front’s statement, the religious ruling was issued by a council of scholars established in 2015 to interpret Islamic teachings and laws. The council comprises scholars from across Afghanistan, including specialists in Quranic exegesis, Islamic theology, hadith, jurisprudence, the biography of the Prophet Muhammad, Islamic doctrine, and other fields of Islamic studies.

These Muslim theologians described the current situation in Afghanistan as nothing short of “tyranny” and declared that liberating Afghans from oppression was their religious duty.

The fatwa could become an important source of religious legitimacy for armed groups opposing Taliban rule. Sami Sadat, the head of the United Front and a former Afghan army commander who held the rank of lieutenant general, welcomed the scholars’ decision and reaffirmed his commitment to armed resistance against the Taliban.

In early August, the same group announced Operation Muharib, targeting Taliban forces and other terrorist groups in the country. Immediately following the announcement, the United Front carried out a series of attacks in several provinces, including Kandahar, Helmand, Ghor, Baghlan, and Badakhshan.

The National Resistance Front and the Afghanistan Freedom Front, two other opposition forces, are also carrying out attacks on Taliban positions, particularly in northern Afghanistan.

In this context, the religious legitimacy associated with the fatwa is particularly significant, as the Taliban largely defines its political identity through its interpretation of Islamic law and presents itself as an Islamic government.

That legitimacy is now being openly challenged. Meanwhile, the armed opposition is seeking to secure broader support both domestically and internationally by establishing contacts with foreign critics and opponents of the Taliban regime.

There are other domestic problems as well. In August, protests erupted among workers in the mining industry. Under a decree issued by Hibatullah Akhundzada concerning gold mining, state-owned land designated for gold extraction was classified as protected, and the Ministry of Mines was instructed to lease it to approved private individuals and companies.

On paper, this appears to be an orderly arrangement. In practice, however, it reflects a policy of clan-based connections and nepotism. Protection is extended to mining sites in which certain individuals connected to the Taliban have vested interests.

Gold, like other natural resources, serves simultaneously as a source of patronage, coercion, and territorial power. The Taliban has established a special mining security force comprising 1,000 fighters to ensure the security of mining operations and push out the influence of local commanders while simultaneously centralizing revenues from gold extraction.

According to official Taliban figures, approximately 100,000 people are directly or indirectly involved in gold mining in Badakhshan Province alone.

However, in countries experiencing medium- and high-intensity conflicts where precious metals are extracted, revenues from these resources also finance paramilitary groups, while sales generally take place through informal channels and on the black market. The United Arab Emirates has held a leading position in this business for many years.

Pakistan has also repeatedly pointed out that Afghanistan remains a serious security threat because the Taliban regime has failed to fulfill its commitments to prevent its territory from being used as a staging ground for attacks against neighboring countries. This has led to border clashes with Taliban forces themselves, including the use of heavy weaponry.

It should be noted that many countries are in no hurry to recognize the Taliban or normalize relations with it. The most compelling argument against improving relations with the Taliban is its treatment of women and girls.

UNESCO and UNICEF have also warned that low levels of educational attainment threaten yet another generation. This problem is institutional rather than temporary in nature.

According to UN Women, nearly eight out of ten young Afghan women have no access to education, employment, or vocational training. A separate legal alert issued in 2026 states that criminal laws adopted by the Taliban further undermine women’s legal status and their access to justice.

Several Western countries, particularly Australia and Canada, have made this issue a cornerstone of their policies and are seeking to maintain pressure on the Taliban.

In keeping with its policy approach, the US State Department maintains that any future normalization of relations or formal recognition will depend on whether the Taliban improves the human rights situation, fulfills its counterterrorism commitments, and releases Americans who have been unlawfully detained.

Although Russia has taken certain positive steps regarding relations with the Taliban regime, an objective assessment suggests that the Taliban itself would prefer to normalize relations with Western countries. This is because it wants to regain access to Afghan assets frozen in Western countries and avoid legal consequences arising from those countries’ institutions. In July 2025, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Taliban supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada and Supreme Court Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani following allegations of gender-based persecution as a crime against humanity.

The UN Secretary-General also identified terrorism, inclusive institutions, and the rights of women and girls as major unresolved issues in Afghanistan.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) adds an economic dimension, warning that the exclusion of women, weak job creation, and declining international assistance are undermining the country’s recovery.

While negotiations through diplomatic channels are a public process, the successes of the armed opposition within Afghanistan could prompt Western countries to provide various forms of support to the Taliban’s opponents, potentially extending to arms supplies.

After all, this fits within the framework of political warfare, at least according to US strategic manuals, under which any means may be employed to overthrow an adversary.

It is no coincidence that Afghanistan’s problems received particular attention in the joint declaration issued following the latest Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit.

Eurasian countries would prefer to resolve the accumulated web of contradictions and problems on their own, without external interference, which, as a rule, invariably leads to prolonged negative consequences.

Source

https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/afghanistans-uncertain-future